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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores whether the expansion of cellular phone networks and community-
based radio broadcasting into rural Pashtun communities could create operational 
vulnerabilities for the Taliban. Divergence is observed between the population’s adaptive 
behavior in response to the Taliban’s rural information strategy and the expansion of the 
information infrastructure. This study shows that this variance in the population’s 
responses could create an operational vulnerability for the Taliban. The success of any 
expansive information strategy, however, may ultimately be limited by the population’s 
fear of Taliban reprisals and other inhibitors, such as illiteracy and inexperience in 
operating advanced technologies. To counter this condition, information strategists 
should implement cellular phone and community radio-based programs in areas where an 
embedded security apparatus, such as the Village Stability Platform (VSP), can enhance 
local security conditions. By reducing the Taliban’s capacity for using violence to 
intimidate the population, developmental advisors embedded within the VSP can 
implement tailored cellular phone and community radio programs that exploit local 
incentive structures more effectively.  With persistence, the benefits of these information 
systems will become increasingly apparent to the population, weakening Taliban 
influence.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the expansion of cellular phone 
and radio broadcast infrastructures into rural Pashtun communities in Afghanistan will 
create vulnerabilities for the Taliban’s rural strategy, creating an opening that a skillful 
information strategy might exploit. In answering this question, the author hopes to be in a 
position to recommend an information strategy that exploits the development of these 
infrastructures to create an operational advantage for International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). The author theorizes that these information systems vary in their capacity 
to create vulnerabilities for the Taliban, and consequently, will require different 
informational exploitations to achieve a strategic advantage.  
Increased connectivity between social networks, ushered in by innovations in 
information systems technology, is apparent across the globe. While this is certainly true 
in parts of Afghanistan, social adaptation to these technological changes within remote 
Pashtun areas is governed by unique socio-economic dynamics. Successful influence 
strategies that leverage or deny the use of information systems technology in Afghanistan 
should reflect an understanding of these environmental variables. Consequently, the 
degree to which the Taliban or ISAF information strategies master these considerations 
could have a systematic impact upon the Taliban’s ability to maintain a lasting influence 
in Afghanistan.  
As described in greater detail in subsequent chapters, both ISAF/GIROA 
(Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) and the Taliban face important 
challenges in successfully implementing their respective information strategies. 
Consistent with historical patterns of conflict with irregular adversaries, one of 
ISAF/GIROA’s most prominent problems is its inability to illuminate the Taliban 
network. The most apparent indicator of this problem is the amount of time and resources 
ISAF must expend to detect and eliminate members of the Taliban’s network. 
Additionally, the Taliban’s ability to conceal its activities makes it difficult for 
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ISAF/GIROA to detect exploitable vulnerabilities in the information environment (IE). 
Similarly, while the Taliban has achieved some success with its shadow government, it 
does not possess a comparative advantage over ISAF in its capacity to deliver economic 
development to the population. Also, the Taliban is highly unpopular with many 
segments of the rural Pashtun population; a problem that it routinely counters with a 
violent narrative of retribution and coercion. A central aspect of this study is to 
understand the role that the expansion of cellular phone networks and radio broadcasts 
infrastructures could play in helping ISAF/GIROA and the Taliban overcome these 
limitations.  
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
To evaluate how the expansion or introduction of cellular phone networks and 
radio broadcast infrastructure into rural Pashtun society could create vulnerabilities for 
the Taliban, this work draws upon literature from framing and social adaptation theories. 
Framing theory is necessary to understand how the Taliban conceives and operationalizes 
its information strategy relative to information systems infrastructure. Social adaptation 
theory literature is relevant because it helps explain the cultural, social, and economic 
factors governing the Afghan population’s response to the Taliban’s information strategy 
and ISAF’s introduction of information infrastructure.  
One must understand how the Taliban has conceived and implemented its 
information strategy before making any assessment of exploitable vulnerabilities. To this 
end, this study draws upon literature from the field of framing theory to develop an 
analytical framework that supports structured evaluation. In his work, Frame Analysis: 
An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Erving Goffman describes frames as 
individual or collective processes that enable people to locate and label occurrences in 
their environments and to assign unique meanings to them.1 Simply put, framing is the 
largely subconscious process by which a target audience arranges information from its 
environment and interprets it, which has important implications for the information 
                                                 
1 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1974), 21.  
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strategies under investigation. First, for an influence campaign to be effective, those 
responsible for its design would have to understand how the target audience would 
perceive and respond to its implementation. A competitor’s understanding of the 
variables that govern the target audience’s interpretation of occurrences in its 
environment could be a significant factor in determining the outcome of influence 
operations.  
Evaluating the degree to which an influence-based campaign accounts for framing 
requires an analytical framework that simplifies a very complex process. Snow and 
Benford largely achieve this, arguing that an understanding of this process is predicated 
upon the mastery of its three core tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and 
motivational framing.2 Diagnostic framing is the process by which a social movement 
organization (SMO) attributes blame or culpability for a perceived problem. Rarely, 
however, does this process result in consensus among SMOs about the source or nature 
of the perceived problem, suggesting an influence operation seeking to exploit an SMO’s 
sentiment might be fraught with complexities.3 The second process, prognostic framing, 
is the process by which SMOs articulate and come to a consensus about how to deal with 
the perceived problem. The relationship between diagnostic and prognostic framing is 
important because the identification of problems naturally constrains the range of an 
SMO’s reactionary responses.4 Additionally, the prognostic process is further constrained 
by other sources of influence in the information environment, such as media and 
competing SMOs. The third process, motivational framing, is the process by which 
SMOs influence others to take action through a variety of means. Simply stated, this is 
the stage of the framing process where an entity implements its strategy, setting in motion 
the actions designed to manipulate the information environment to achieve its objectives. 
Underpinning the motivational process, and the theoretical output of framing process, is 
the construction of the themes that will motivate and guide the actions of others.5  
                                                 
2 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 615.  
3 Ibid., 617.  
4 Ibid., 616. 
5 Ibid., 617.  
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The second body of literature informing this study, social adaptation theory, is 
important because it provides a framework for understanding how the Afghan population 
could respond to competing information strategies. Lucius Bristol’s, Social Adaptation: A 
Study in the Development of Adaption as a Theory, facilitates the understanding of this 
complex process through his “mode of adaptation” model. He explains a group’s 
response to change is a function of its environment and its mode of adaptation. According 
to Bristol, two categories of environment exist, material and social, and two classes of 
adaptation, passive and active.6  
For the purposes of this study, active adaptation, the purposeful modification of a 
social order to suit environmental changes, is the most relevant adaptive mode for 
analysis because it emphasizes measurable responses a population can make in response 
to environmental manipulation. Similarly, the elements of both the social and material 
aspects of the environment are relevant to this study. The importance of the social 
dimension of the environment is apparent because it addresses the cognitive and cultural 
functions that affect adaptation. Additionally, the physical dimension is worthy of 
consideration because it highlights the importance physical infrastructure can play in 
transforming society (as seen in the Industrial Revolution).  Passive adaptation, a long-
term process that changes culture, language, and customs, is not relevant for analysis 
since this study is designed to determine if the expansion of information infrastructure 
will create vulnerabilities for the Taliban prior to the expected withdraw of ISAF in 2014. 
Consequently, as Figure 1.1 shows, this study focuses upon two modes of social 
adaptation, active-material and active-social. In this study, the active-material mode 
refers to the process by which the Taliban and ISAF either expand or reduce 
Afghanistan’s information infrastructure as part of an information strategy. The active-
social mode is relevant because it emphasizes the purposeful adjustment of a community 
or individual’s social structure in response to environmental changes. While Bristol’s  
 
 
                                                 
6 Lucius Bristol, Social Adaptation: A Study in Development of Adaptation as a Theory (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1921), 9.  
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model provides this study with broad classifications of adaptations relevant to influence 
operations in Afghanistan, it does not describe the specific behaviors that could emerge 
from individuals and communities adapting to information strategies.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Bristol’s Model for Modes of Adaptation7  
Filling this void, Robert K. Merton’s, Social Theory and Social Structure, 
provides this study with a typology of adaptive behaviors that reflect a range of 
community and individual responses to social manipulation. According to Merton, social 
structures will shift between each of these modes of behavior as they engage in different 
types of social influence activities. 8 The first type of behavior, conformity, occurs when 
community members agree with an entity’s goals and use socially accepted means 
                                                 
7 Bristol, Social Adaptation, 9.  
8 Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), 140.  
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through which to achieve them.  Consequently, conformity is the most frequent type of 
adaptation and is more closely associated with collective behaviors than other modes. 
Since this study’s focus is on how information strategies alter social structures, there is 
little utility in further explaining this mode of adaptation.  
The second behavior, innovation, is predicated upon the existence of “success-
goal” emphasis within the social structure’s culture and a willingness to abandon 
traditional, institutionalized means of achieving that success.9 The Afghan social 
structure’s capacity for innovation is important to this study because many of its areas are 
characterized by an undeveloped information infrastructure, making the development of 
this form of social adaptation within the community a precursor to the success of an 
expansive information strategy. Since, according to Merton, understanding the cultural 
factors affecting a social structure’s predisposition to this type of adaptation is critical to 
understanding a community’s potential for innovation, this study evaluates literature from 
Afghan culture in subsequent paragraphs.10  
The third behavior, rebellion, is a mode of adaptation associated with individuals 
and communities who, having experienced alienation, seek to change a social structure 
radically. According to Merton, “when the institutional system is regarded as the barrier 
to the satisfaction of legitimized goals, the stage is set for rebellion as an adaptive 
response.”11 Rebellion, as observed by Merton, requires revolutionaries to completely 
withdraw from their social structures and adopt new orientations. Since information 
strategies seek to affect social change through the manipulation of the information 
environment, it is feasible that a competing narrative could spark a rebellion, and thus, 
making it an important consideration in the development of this study’s framework.  
The fourth and fifth modes of adaptation, retreatism and ritualism, are related to 
rebellion in the sense that they involve the repudiation of the social structure and its 
norms. However, these behaviors also possess key features that distinguish them from 
                                                 
9 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 141.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., 155. 
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rebellion. Retreatism, the least likely form of adaptation, is largely an individual behavior 
that occurs when culturally assimilated people in a society do not have access to the same 
avenues to success as others in a community. As a result, they tacitly withdraw from 
productive society, becoming “in society, but not of it.”12 For the purposes of this study, 
the author does not consider retreatism because it does not represent collective behavior. 
Ritualism also entails the abandonment of cultural norms, but adaptive measures are 
largely confined to institutionalized norms.13 Simply stated, while ritualistic communities 
might acknowledge cognitively that aspects of their existing social structure must be 
changed in response to external manipulation, their overt behaviors do not change. 
Therefore, ritualism is not deviant behavior, an important point of divergence from 
rebellion.  Ritualistic behaviors are important to consider in this study because they 
account for modes of adaptation that lie outside easily observed patterns of behaviors, 
such as conformity and rebellion. 
Possessing a theoretical framework for understanding the modes of adaptations 
and the range of potential behaviors associated with each, the next step is to develop an 
understanding of the dynamics of Afghanistan’s culture that will govern the population’s 
range of responses to external manipulation. For the purposes of this study, the author 
only examines cultural dynamics in the Pashtun areas because they are the most 
operationally relevant to ISAF’s campaign in Afghanistan. To understand what aspects of 
Pashtun culture will govern social adaptation, this work draws upon the expertise 
scholars and practitioners who have studied Afghan culture and have engaged in 
influence operations there.  
Three important works informed this study’s conceptualization of Pashtun culture. 
First, Shahmahmood Miakhel, former Deputy Minister of the Interior in Afghanistan 
(2003–2005), recently wrote an informative paper entitled “The Importance of Tribal 
Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance.”  
 
 
                                                 
12 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 153.  
13 Ibid.  
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This work is important because it not only describes the most important cultural 
dynamics of Pashtun culture, but also highlighted why these dynamics provide 
opportunities and challenges to those seeking to mobilize Afghan tribes.  
The second work, Lincoln Keiser’s Friend by Day, Enemy by Night: Organized 
Vengeance in a Kohistani Community, is a cultural anthropologist’s case study of social 
adaptation within a Pashtun community. It is critical to this thesis because it provides a 
rare, nuanced view of how Pashtun communities make decisions, resolve conflicts, 
respond to outsiders, and adapt to threats.  
The third work, The TRADOC G-2 Human Terrain System’s (HTS) “My 
Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun “Tribes,” conceived as a response to 
ISAF’s emphasis upon tribal engagement, is important to this study because it analyzes 
many of the social and cultural factors that affect social adaptation in rural Pashtun 
communities, a critical area for ISAF influence operations. Additionally, because no 
monolithic view of Pashtun culture exists, it shows the limitations associated with 
evaluating Afghan society through a purely tribal framework. According to the HTS’ 
report, surveys suggest that certain non-tribal aspects of rural Pashtun life are equally as 
important, if not more so, as tribal dynamics that govern social adaptation.14 The author 
uses both of these works to describe many of these dynamics and show how they relate to 
the research question. 
1. Honor/Shame 
The Pashtun concept of honor has two dimensions relevant to this study, Aizzat 
and Ghrairat. Ghrairat is given to Muslim males by Allah and is considered by believers 
to be closely linked to personal integrity.15 The key point regarding Ghrairat is that while 
the Pashtun believe that it cannot be earned by a man’s earthly actions, he can lose it by 
failing to meet important obligations. For example, it is common to find men in Pashtun 
                                                 
14 United States Army, TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A 
Study of Pashtun Tribes in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009), 5.  
15 Lincoln Keiser, Friend by Day, Enemy by Night: Organized Vengeance in a Kohistani Community 
(Belmont: Thomson, 2002), 53.  
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villages that believe that they can lose Ghrairat by not successfully protecting their 
women.16 Aizzat, on the other hand, is respect that is given by others within an 
individual’s community. Wealth, esteem, and political power are common indications of 
Aizzat within Pashtun communities. While Aizzat is important, it is clearly less important 
than Ghrairat, which is relevant to this study because it shows that an Afghan’s sense of 
Aizzat is not so strong as to discourage innovation and entrepreneurship because the risk 
of failure is too strong. Only if the business venture violates Islamic principles would 
honor absolutely be an inhibitor to innovation. Additionally, since revenge is an 
important means by which a Pashtun reclaims his sense of honor, information strategies 
implemented in remote areas of Afghanistan could indirectly lead to community 
instability and conflict.  
2. Islam 
While Islam itself is insufficient to explain decision-making within Pashtun 
communities fully, its consideration is necessary because it limits the degree to which an 
information strategy can manipulate other variables affecting social adaptation. The 
literature shows that external entities, particularly those considered to be infidels, seeking 
to expand their influence into a Pashtun community, would not be successful if the 
people see them as a threat to Islam. For example, Keiser recalled a moment when 
members of a Pashtun village were exhorting the jirga not to grant him access to the 
community because they were infidels. Only after two important town leaders explained 
to the community that their presence did not violate Islamic law and that Allah would 
bless their community for showing the visitors hospitality were the community’s fears 
allayed.17 Keiser also shows that Pashtun religious beliefs are so strong that community 
attitudes tend to be fatalistic with regard to temporal matters. Consequently, while they 
believe that Allah grants personal safety and wealth, their sense of Aizzat is something 
left to their control.18  
                                                 
16 Keiser, Friend by Day, Enemy by Night: Organized Vengeance in a Kohistani Community, 54.  
17 Ibid., 31.  
18 Ibid.  
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Understanding the role Islam plays in these communities is important to this study 
for three reasons. First, Islam serves as an effective screening criterion for the 
introduction of developmental or informational strategies into these communities. 
Second, whether or not the developmental initiative violates Islamic principles, 
opposition or support within Pashtun communities, while framed by Islamic themes, 
could nevertheless be grounded in economic, political, and social considerations. 
Therefore, gaining the support of respected members of the community who are fully 
aware of this dynamic and are sufficiently persuasive to navigate these waters is critical. 
Third, because Pashtuns are fatalistic in outlook, external entities seeking to implement 
developmental or entrepreneurial initiatives should not always assume that an 
individual’s motivation for personal safety is more powerful than the opportunity to 
increase his honor.  
3. Economics 
Innovation, competition, and achievement in the pursuit of goals are not 
inconsistent with Pashtun cultural values, and therefore, are important considerations in 
evaluating social adaptation to increased opportunity for economic development. In fact, 
these dynamics are so strong in Pashtun culture that it puts family members in 
competition with one another for the honor of bringing a source of prosperity into the 
village. As the HTS report observes, this sense of competition drives competing family 
members to co-opt entities outside their communities or kinship networks to provide 
resources that help them gain an advantage over their rivals.19 Keiser agrees, citing an 
incident where members of Pakistani Pashtun community used hospitality to induce a 
government veterinarian to limit his services to only their animals.20 Miakhel also agrees, 
but suggests that competition (seyali) is only permitted against persons of equal status  
 
                                                 
19 United States Army G2, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun Tribes in 
Afghanistan, 12.  
20 Keiser, Friend by Day, Enemy by Night: Organized Vengeance in a Kohistani Community, 19.  
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within the social structure.21 The cultural genesis of intra-community competition is an 
important consideration for this study because it could influence, positively or negatively, 
initiatives designed to develop a community’s economy.  
Wealth is also not inconsistent with Pashtun cultural values. Since the possession 
of wealth is so heavily associated with their sense of honor, if a Pashtun cannot defend 
his wealth, he loses favor within his social network and faces the prospects of losing face 
or even outright ejection from the community.22 This dynamic is relevant to this study 
and poses two interesting questions that warrant deeper analysis. First, if the expansion of 
a community’s information infrastructure has the potential to deliver economic benefits 
previously unseen by a Pashtun community, how could an information strategy nurture 
traditional cultural mores associated with innovation and competition to generate 
community interest. Second, given the emphasis Pashtuns place upon defending their 
wealth, how can an information strategy exploit Taliban efforts to deny the population’s 
access to a potentially profitable venture and create a popular backlash against their 
efforts?  
4. Patronage 
Identity, while an important variable impacting adaptation, is a broad concept 
requiring refinement to be useful in a structured analysis. It is incorrect to assume that a 
typical Pashtun village is comprised of people bound by a single identity that guides them 
to collective action. Similarly, tribalism is problematic because it assumes unity of effort 
and purpose. As will be described in the following paragraphs, the literature shows that to 
influence rural Pashtun communities, information strategists must think beyond tribal 
lines and evaluate other identities more important for purposes of social adaptation. 
Instead, patronage appears to be a common dynamic apparent in rural Pashtun decision-
making structures across tribal and non-tribal identities, and thus, making it a relevant 
variable affecting social adaptation.  
                                                 
21 Shahahmood Miakhel, “The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their 
Role in Security and Governance,” 2008, 2, http://pashtoonkhwa.com/files/articles/Miakhel%20-
%20Importance%20of%20Tribal%20Structures%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf. 
22 Ibid., 3.  
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Common views on Pashtun tribes are that they organize along kinship lines and 
that they act collectively to achieve their goals. While true in some cases, this view 
neglects the historical tendency of Pashtun decision makers to make practical decision 
often at odds with blood relatives.23 For this reason, experts in Afghan cultures 
sometimes prefer the use of the term qawm, meaning a group of people not necessarily 
related within a community whose common beliefs lead them to act in solidarity.24 The 
important point here is that qawms change, many times in response to individual 
adjustment to environmental conditions, and not out of blind adherence to familial 
preference.25  
5. Patronage 
On the other hand, patronage, while not always practiced along tribal and kinship 
lines, is an enduring aspect of Pashtun culture that governs social adaptation within and 
sometimes across communities. According to the HTS report, decades of war and 
external manipulation have, in some cases, created a culture within Pashtun tribes where 
“strongmen” form followings within Pashtun areas by providing services to the people 
regardless of familial ties.26 In other cases, a patronage network, where a khan distributes 
goods and services to the people to maintain the community’s loyalty, manifests this 
dynamic. While familial affiliation often plays an important role in determining the 
distribution of the goods, the HTS report demonstrates that it is not culturally inconsistent 
for patronage to favor non-tribal and non-familial entities if it helps the khan achieve a 
political advantage.27  
The consideration of patronage in rural Pashtun villages is not limited to the 
distribution of economic benefits, but also extends to security arrangements. A critical, 
                                                 
23 United States Army G2, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun Tribes in 
Afghanistan, 9.  
24 Miakhel, The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in 
Security and Governance,” 1.  
25 United States Army G2, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun Tribes in 
Afghanistan, 9.  
26 Ibid., 13. 
27 Ibid., 14.  
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yet largely unknown, social identifier that could prove to be a major determinant in social 
adaptation is the andawalii—a term that means “friendship” in Pashto.28 Based upon the 
system of patronage described above, andawalli refers to the tendency of powerful 
figures to be accompanied by a group of trusted loyalists as they progress in life. These 
links are considered to be among the strongest in Pashtun culture today because many of 
them were forged while serving as mujahedeen during the Soviet War in Afghanistan. 
After the Taliban’s rise to power, the andawalli network appeared in its governmental 
structure, particularly in military, police, and intelligence agencies.  
Pashtun patronage is important to this study for several reasons. First, it shows 
that it is not culturally inconstant for entities outside of a Pashtun kinship network to 
leverage influence over the community. Whether done through the model of the 
patronage network, or external entities, such as the anti-Soviet mujahedeen, the literature 
shows that it is possible for parties external to the kinship network to subsume local, 
Pashtun social structures. Second, it shows that a patron’s capacity to influence a Pashtun 
community is just as likely to be governed by their ability to deliver goods and services to 
the community as it is by familial ties. Third, since it is likely that future Taliban, 
GIORA, and local security arrangements will be based upon andawalli, it will be relevant 
to understand the role that information infrastructure expansion can have in solidifying or 
degrading this identity. Fourth, economic benefits tied to the introduction of information 
infrastructure in rural areas can serve as a powerful incentive for key figures within a 
patronage network to put their relationships to work to ISAF’s advantage.  
6. Conflict 
Local conflict is a fixture of Pashtun culture and is not only a significant variable 
in predicting social adaptation, but has been exploited by external entities seeking to 
control these areas throughout recent history. As previously discussed, competition 
among community members with familial ties emerges from a variety of sources 
including a Pashtun’s sense of honor or a male’s desire to better position himself for 
                                                 
28 Borhan Younus, “Understanding the Afghan War, Part Two: Rise of Taliban and State Crisis,” 
March 19, 2008, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-
Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout&cid=1203758215509. 
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inheritance. Consequently, violent conflict emerges from this milieu, particularly in areas 
with weak community institutions. Traditional tribal and community institutions, such as 
the jirga and shura, have been weakened by years of war because mujahidin 
commanders, the communist government of the 1980s and early 1990s, strongmen, and 
the Taliban have targeted generations of effective community elites in an effort to 
implement their own institutions to influence the population.29  
In some Pashtun areas, the crippling of traditional conflict resolution apparatuses, 
such as jirgas, coupled with the GIROA’s inability to solve local disputes, has created a 
void that the Taliban has filled with its own institutions. For example, in some cases, the 
Taliban’s willingness to serve as a fair and efficient arbiter of local disputes makes it a 
community asset. Being responsive (reaching arbiters is easy as making a phone call), not 
requiring an oath of allegiance, or demanding payment from affected parties, practices 
based upon Islamic principles, all make the Taliban an efficient source of justice and 
increases its legitimacy in the face of the populace.30 In essence, this represents an effort 
by the Taliban to provide a valued service that, with continued success, will generate trust 
within Pashtun communities. Therefore, local conflict is an important consideration for 
this study because, as the Taliban have demonstrated, the establishment of apparatuses 
that answer the population’s call to adjudicate their disputes is a means to gain influence. 
From the perspective of this study, a key question emerges: can the expansion of 
information infrastructure increase social capital and serve to help Pashtun communities 
deal with conflict more effectively than the Taliban?  
This idea is critical to this study for several reasons. First, successful information 
strategies in Pashtun areas cannot assume tribal collectivism and must either mend or 
exploit rifts within kinship networks to be successful. For example, during the Soviet 
War in Afghanistan, the mujahedeen were able to gain access to and expand their 
influence within certain areas by allying with one or more parties involved in disputes 
                                                 
29 United States Army G2, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun Tribes in 
Afghanistan, 17.  
30 Yochi Dreazen and Siobhan Gorman, “Taliban Regains Power, Influence in Afghanistan: Sets Up 
Courts, Local Governments in Southern Regions,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122713845685342447.html. 
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between members of the same kinship network. Such an approach not only enabled the 
mujahedeen to alter the balance of power within a community in a way that secured an 
operational advantage, but it also guaranteed recruits for the insurgency.31 Additionally, 
prior to Pakistani independence, Nawab rulers in Pashtun areas encouraged local strife by 
encouraging blood vengeance. Essentially, by levying fines against offended parties for 
not seeking revenge, Nawabs provided an economic incentive that fostered enough 
divisiveness within Pashtun communities that enabled better control of the population.32  
Second, lacking a solid historical tradition of collective action, it is completely feasible 
for Pashtun tribes to respond to an external information strategy with any one of the 
Merton’s modes of behaviors (Figure 1.3), validating its usefulness as an analytical 
framework. 
Before introducing the variables that govern this study, it is useful to summarize 
the major points emerging from the literature by incorporating them into an analytical 
model. A structured analysis of how the introduction of information infrastructure affects 
social adaptation in Pashtun communities is only possible with the construction of an 
analytical model because it effectively simplifies a complex process. To this end, the 
author has developed a social adaptation and influence model representative of a Pashtun 
community (Figure 1.2). As the model shows, the process by which the Taliban’s rural 
strategy manipulates the community’s information environment is conceptualized and 
implemented through the completion of Snow’s framing tasks, diagnosis, prognosis, and 
motivation. Next, the model shows that social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities is 
governed by four socio-cultural factors: economic utility, informational reach, patronage, 
and safety. Finally, the population will demonstrate one of four modes of social 
adaptation, as described by Merton: conformity, innovation, rebellion, or ritualism. It is 
important to note that this is a conceptual model. The next section describes how this  
 
 
                                                 
31 United States Army G2, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun Tribes in 
Afghanistan, 12.  
32 Keiser, Friend by Day, Enemy by Night: Organized Vengeance in a Kohistani Community, 48. 
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model is operationalized and integrated into a structured analysis that evaluates the role 




Figure 1.2. Influence Operations Framework for Pashtun Community  
C. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The population’s responses to competing information strategies serve as this 
study’s dependent variable (DV). This study measures variation within the dependent 
variable by the range of behaviors the population exhibits within Pashtun socio-cultural 
constraints. According to the Pashtun community influence model in Figure 1.2, these 
responses will be measured qualitatively using Merton’s modes of social adaptation: 
conformity, rebellion, ritualism, and innovation. Conformity will be judged when an 
information strategy induces the population to align its goals with that of the competitor. 
Rebellion will be judged when a competitor’s information strategy causes the population 
to view it as an obstacle to the realization of community goals and responds with active 
resistance. Ritualism will be judged when a competitor’s information strategy causes the 
population to view it as an obstacle to the realization of community goals, but does not 
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respond with an active resistance in deference to other interests. Innovation will be 
judged when a competitor’s information strategy does not cause the population to view it 
as an obstacle to the realization of community goals, but rather induces them to make 
changes to the traditional manner in which they pursue these goals.  
To operationalize the population’s responses, the author uses Merton’s typology 
for modes of social adaptation. Merton’s typology is useful because it affixes qualitative 
values to each of the modes of social adaptation described in the literature review: 
conformity innovation, rebellion, and ritualism. As shown in Figure 1.3, each mode is 
associated with either the population’s acceptance (+) or rejection (-) of the external 
entity’s goals. Similarly, each mode is also associated with the population’s acceptance 
(+) or rejection (-) of the means by which the external entity seeks to achieve its goals. 
According to Merton’s typology, each mode will be judged based upon the composite 
result of both evaluations. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, conformity will be 
judged when the population accepts both the goals and means of an information strategy 
or activity. Conversely, rebellion will be judged when the population rejects both the 
goals and means of an information strategy. Innovation will be judged when the 
population accepts an information strategy’s goal, but rejects the means by which it 
implements it. Finally, ritualism will be judged when a population rejects an information 
strategy’s goals, but does not resist the means by which it is implemented. Figure 1.3 
summarizes how this study operationalizes the DV.  
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Figure 1.3. Population’s Response to Taliban’s Informational Isolation Adapted 
from Merton’s Typology of Social Adaptation33 
D.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The structure and complexity of this study will require four independent variables 
(IV). The first IV is the Taliban’s rural information strategy. The author operationalizes 
this variable by conducting a qualitative evaluation of the Taliban’s core framing tasks: 
diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. This variable is relevant because it is not possible 
to evaluate the degree to which the introduction of information systems into rural Pashtun 
communities would create a vulnerability for the Taliban without first understanding how 
its own information strategy impacts social adaptation.  
ISAF/GIROA’s expansion or introduction of a cellular phone network and radio 
broadcast infrastructure into rural Pashtun communities represent the second and third 
IVs, respectively. The selection of these two variables is relevant for two important 
reasons. First, since both the Taliban and ISAF/GIROA are employing these media as 
                                                 
33 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 140.  
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part of their respective influence campaigns, using these IVs to answer the research 
question will yield valuable insight into a relevant operational problem. Second, since 
Afghanistan’s radio broadcast and cellular phone networks already represent diverse 
categories of infrastructural maturity, using these IVs will allow this study to develop a 
framework planners could use to determine the costs and benefits of expanding a wide 
variety of informational infrastructures. Radio broadcasts have been a fixture of Afghan 
culture since the 1970s and are among one of the most widely used in terms of receiving 
and transmitting information in rural Pashtun communities.34 While radio has the longest 
relationship with the population of Afghanistan, cellular phone networks have rapidly 
generated users throughout the country, making it the most widely accessible form of 
two-way communication in the country. In fact, experts suggest that there could be over 
10 million cell phone users in Afghanistan today, a figure that far exceeds the 4.3 million 
citizens who participated in the 2009 elections.35 
E.  HYPOTHESES 
The author employs each of these independent variables to test the study’s three 
hypotheses. First, he hypothesizes that the Taliban’s rural information strategy contains 
vulnerabilities that make it susceptible to informational exploitation. An evaluation of 
this hypothesis’ performance is critical for this study because it will serve as the baseline 
from which to evaluate the degree to which GIROA/ISAF informational activities can 
achieve an operational advantage against the Taliban. This study’s second hypothesis is 
that the expansion of Afghanistan’s cellular phone network into rural Pashtun areas can 
create vulnerabilities for the Taliban. Similarly, the third hypothesis is that the expansion 
of Afghanistan’s radio broadcast infrastructure into rural Pashtun areas can create 
vulnerabilities for the Taliban. An evaluation of both of these hypotheses will describe 
how the introduction of respective information systems will impact social adaption in 
rural areas of Afghanistan. Ultimately, by testing each of these hypotheses, the author can  
 
                                                 
34 Andrew Skuse, “Radio, Politics, and Trust in Afghanistan,” Gazette 64 (2002): 268.  
35 Gerrard Russell, “Calling All Voters,” Foreign Policy: The AFPAK Channel, January 15, 2010, 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/15/calling_all_voters?sms_ss=email. 
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compare each of the population’s adaptive responses to draw substantiated conclusions 
about the ability of ISAF/GIROA to use information infrastructure to achieve an 
operational advantage over the Taliban.  
F.  METHODOLOGY 
Since this study is evaluating rural Pashtun responses to the Taliban and 
ISAF/GIROA’s information activities, it must incorporate factors that govern social 
adaptation within the target audience. Consequently, each IV in this study will be 
evaluated against a fixed set of relevant socio-cultural factors linked to social adaption in 
rural Pashtun communities. Based upon the author’s survey of literature from social 
adaptation theory and Pashtun cultural studies, he determined that the following factors 
were most appropriate for this study: economic utility, informational reach, patronage, 
and safety.  
By using an illustrative example methodology, this work shows how the 
expansion or introduction of different information could impact social adaptation in rural 
Pashtun communities and could create operational vulnerabilities for the Taliban that a 
skillful information strategy could exploit. To this end, this study has two primary 
components. First, evaluating the potential vulnerabilities that an ISAF information 
strategy can create for the Taliban requires an understanding of how that Taliban’s 
current information strategy affects social adaptation within the populace. Therefore, the 
first component of this study shows how the Taliban’s information strategy (IV#1) affects 
social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities, controlling for ISAF influence. Since the 
conformist mode of social adaptation represents a Pashtun community’s complete 
acquiescence to external manipulation, Hypothesis 1 will be supported if this study 
judges the DV as innovation, rebellion, or ritualism. Figure 1.4 illustrates how the author 
has incorporated IV#1 and the DV into this study’s influence operations framework for 
rural Pashtun communities (shown in Figure 1.2) to evaluate the performance of 





Figure 1.4.  Component One: The Taliban’s Information Strategy and Social 
Adaptation 
The second component of this study evaluates the impact of the expansion or 
introduction of information systems infrastructure (IV #2 and 3) upon the rural Pashtun 
information environment. Similarly, hypotheses 2 and 3 will be supported if the 
expansion of the respective information infrastructure results in a mode of social 
adaptation closer to conformity than that which the Taliban achieved with its rural 
information strategy. Figure 1.5 illustrates how the author has incorporated the second 
and third IVs and the DV into this study’s influence operations framework for rural 
Pashtun communities (shown in Figure 1.2) to evaluate the performance of the second 
and third hypotheses. 









Figure 1.5. Component Two: Evaluating how Information Systems Expansion 
Affects Social Adaption in Pashtun Areas 
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II. THE TALIBAN’S RURAL INFORMATION STRATEGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive analysis of the Taliban’s 
rural information strategy. First, the author provides a brief historical background of the 
political and social developments that have informed the Taliban’s strategy. Second, he 
describes the Taliban’s rural information strategy through the framework of Merton’s 
typology of social adaptation (described in Chapter I). This analysis serves as the 
foundation upon which the author, in Chapter III, evaluates the relationship between the 
Taliban’s rural information strategy and the factors governing adaptive behavior in rural 
Pashtun communities.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The Taliban’s current information strategy is best understood in historical context 
of history. Decades of war and instability have led to the development of an internal 
struggle for power in rural Pashtun society between reactionary tribal traditionalists and 
revolutionary militant Islamists. Consequently, in areas controlled by the Taliban, social 
structures do not only flow along familial lines, but also emerge from an increasingly 
apparent achievement-based culture.36 Consequently, adaptive behavior in rural Pashtun 
areas today reflects tendencies from both sides of this social conflict. To provide greater 
context to the Taliban’s rural information strategy, the author briefly discusses two 
components of the early-1990s Taliban rural strategy that have particular relevance 
today: the exploitation of its access to social endowments and the manipulation of 
traditional power structures.  
The Taliban’s emergence as an important entity in rural Pashtun communities had 
its roots in 1989, when warlords fought one another for power after the Soviet 
                                                 
36 Brian Sweeney, “AN IO Perspective on Afghanistan: An Appreciation for Tribal Complexity,” 
(presentation presented at the MORS Irregular Warfare Workshop, MacDill Air Force Base, February 4, 
2010).  
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withdrawal.37 During this time, civil strife and power politics caused community leaders 
to focus their energies upon accumulating power. This singularity of focus created 
significant distance between leaders and the large segments of the war-weary rural 
Pashtun population, a condition that the Taliban were quick to exploit.38 Embarking upon 
a plan that involved disarmament and the implementation of sharia law, the Taliban 
believed that holding sway over the Pashtun would give them a base of support from 
which they would seize control over the rest of the country. To this end, the Taliban 
developed and implemented a strategic approach that mobilized rural Pashtun 
communities in sufficient strength to allow them to challenge the warlords.  
The first factor that facilitated the Taliban’s successful mobilization of the rural 
Pashtun areas was that it had access to social endowments that allowed it to relate to the 
population. Social endowments are essentially personal networks forged from common 
identities, ethnicities, ideologies, and linguistic traditions necessary for the formation of a 
strong revolutionary movement. Groups that share social endowments with the 
population reduce the cost of engagement since interests, language, and worldview tend 
to be similar.39 During the 1990s, the Taliban understood and successfully manipulated 
these connections with rural Pashtun communities, making them the only group to 
mobilize rural Pashtun society successfully since 1978. On the most basic level, since the 
Taliban are a Sunni Muslim Pashtun organization, it comes as little surprise that it framed 
its narrative accordingly to influence rural Sunni Muslim Pashtun communities. For 
example, by remaining objective in community disputes, showing respect for 
Pashtunwali, and not appearing like an organization out to exploit the masses for 
economic or political gain, the Taliban appealed to the larger rural Pashtun community.40 
                                                 
37 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: 
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Sharing social endowments with the population made it easier for the Taliban to 
establish social networks with the population during the 1990s, an important reason for 
their success during that time. However, as described in Chapter I, having access to 
common social endowments is not the only factor that governs social adaptation in rural 
Pashtun communities. Again, economic utility, perceptions of safety, informational reach, 
and patronage are the most important factors governing adaptive behavior in these areas. 
The second factor that accounts for the Taliban’s successful rural strategy during this 
time was its ability to understand community leadership structures and use its narrative to 
manipulate the political landscape in rural Pashtun communities. For example, during the 
1990s, the Taliban’s narrative altered existing leadership arrangements by marginalizing 
leaders within their own communities. Since tribal identities had already been weakened 
by years of war, ushering in an era where achievement started to matter more than 
inheritance, the Taliban rarely emphasized tribal themes and emphasized instead 
community aspirations for justice rooted in Pashtunwali and Islam.41  
No better example of this exists than the story that emerged in 1994 of a small 
group of Talibs, acting on behalf of Singesar neighbors who claimed that a local warlord 
had kidnapped and raped two teenage girls. The Taliban, in response, attacked the 
warlord’s heavily armed garrison, freeing the girls and executing the offenders.42 Taliban 
spokesmen also made frequent use of statements that the movement’s goal was not to 
pursue political power, but to restore peace and justice to Afghanistan. These themes 
resonated well with war-weary communities in rural Pashtun communities and also 
served to confuse the Taliban’s political opponents, who struggled to understand the 
nature of the new movement. Such informational efforts were critical not only because 
they encouraged followers to abandon their leaders and seek the patronage of the Taliban, 
but also because it created an environment of confusion that allowed the upstart 
organization to buy time to influence more areas across the country. Over time, the 
Taliban’s control of the Pashtun areas in the south and east became a material and 
ideological support zone that proved to be critical to its campaigns in other parts of 
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Afghanistan. Interestingly, this base of support also enabled the Taliban’s eventual 
capture of Nangarhar province in 1996, a key event that led to the group’s strategic 
relationship with Al-Qaeda.43 The Taliban’s campaign in the north and west and its 
provision of protection to Al-Qaeda, however, represent a series of events whose details 
lie beyond the scope of this study.  
While the US-led offensive caused many tribes to flee the country in 2002, the 
Taliban successfully re-infiltrated rural Pashtun communities in subsequent years and 
implemented a new information strategy. As will be seen later in this chapter, while 
elements of its 1990s information strategy are still apparent in its current strategy, 
changing operational conditions have required the Taliban to make important changes to 
their informational approach. As Giustozzi observes, the “neo-Taliban” that reemerged in 
Afghanistan in 2004 used “all available networks--political, economic, social, and 
military--to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are 
too costly for the perceived benefit.”44 The presence of this strand of commanders and 
fighters is becoming increasingly apparent in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan.45  
The presence of an international coalition and an established central government 
in Afghanistan makes the Taliban’s strategic problem quite different from the one it faced 
in the 1990s, forcing them to cooperate with organizations, such as Hezb-e-Islami and 
criminal networks to achieve its immediate objectives. Therefore, from a strategic 
perspective, the following considerations, what Thruelsen calls “drivers of common 
interests,” become very important to the implementation of the Taliban’s new strategy: 
having a common enemy in ISAF/GIROA, exploiting insecurity and corruption to 
achieve economic gains, and possessing historical ties and social endowments.46 
Therefore, in addition to securing rural Pashtun areas as a base of support from which to 
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seize control of Afghanistan, the Taliban must have incentives to sustain a functional 
relationship with other guerrilla movements to maintain sufficient pressure on the 
GIROA and the international coalition to prompt a near-term withdraw.  
Another important environmental difference facing the Taliban in 2004 was the 
increased availability of information systems, such as the Internet, radio, and cellular 
phones, through which to communicate and to disseminate propaganda. As the author 
discusses later in this chapter, the Taliban’s current information strategy is 
distinguishable from the one it implemented in the 1990s because today it makes good 
use of new media, spokesmen, and media operations to disseminate propaganda to 
undermine ISAF/GIROA. However, the presence of these same systems presents 
ISAF/GIROA and other groups with an opportunity to implement an information strategy 
that exploits latent or apparent vulnerabilities in the Taliban’s approach. Understanding 
how this can happen is the purpose of this study and is discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapters.  
Understanding the historical context and changes in environmental conditions 
surrounding their current position, the Taliban appear to be trying to create a stalemate 
with ISAF, by conducting attacks, recruiting members, inducing defections, and 
providing government-like services to the population to establish a base of support from 
which to coordinate a long-term guerrilla war.47 As Nagl suggests, the effective 
informational activities that support this mode of guerrilla warfare includes the 
dissemination of messages through multiple channels that undermine the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the established authorities.48 The purpose of this chapter is to determine 
if the Taliban’s informational activities supporting its “strategic stalemate” contains 
apparent or latent vulnerabilities that ISAF can exploit.  
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C.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE #1: THE TALIBAN’S RURAL 
INFORMATION STRATEGY 
Underpinning the Taliban’s strategic calculus is the belief that the better part of 
the ISAF military campaign is complete and that the United States will soon transition to 
a strategy to containment against the Taliban.49 Therefore, the Taliban’s strategy seeks to 
do whatever is necessary to maintain its influence in areas it controls and to contain ISAF 
influence victories in other areas. Additionally, the Taliban seeks to sustain this effort 
long enough not only to prompt the withdraw ISAF forces, but also to maintain sufficient 
strength to seize power from the GIROA. To this end, the Taliban must complement its 
military operations against ISAF forces with an influence campaign that seeks to 
maintain its influence within areas it controls. However, the Taliban approach must 
overcome a series of strategic problems. As outlined in the Chapter I, the author evaluates 
the Taliban’s rural information strategy through Bedford and Snow’s three framing 
processes: diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation.  
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Figure 2.1. Independent Variable #1: The Taliban’s Rural Information Strategy 
1. Diagnosis 
As described in the literature review, diagnosis is the framing task where the 
Taliban determines the nature of the problem it faces in controlling the population in rural 
Pashtun communities. Evidence suggests that the Taliban sees three problems with 
controlling rural Pashtun communities as a means to achieving its overall strategic goals. 
First, it does not have the physical means to control every rural Pashtun area directly. 
Second, relative to ISAF, it lacks the capacity to marshal reconstruction and economic 
development resources for use in its own influence operations. Third, the effective 
command and control of the localized guerrilla campaign, heavily reliant upon a 
knowledge-based infrastructure (KBI), could be degraded by ISAF targeting. 
Similar to ISAF’s strategy of tribal engagement, the Taliban faces the problem of 
having to implement a localized information strategy without enough personnel to 
maintain an active presence in every rural Pashtun community. To understand why this 
 30
condition is a problem for the Taliban, it is useful to discuss briefly the benefits a 
localized strategy brings. First, implementing this strategy in rural Pashtun areas gives the 
Taliban direct access to traditional, local decision-making bodies, such as shuras and 
jirgas. Having this access allows it to influence outcomes by offering inducements or 
threats of violence to gain the cooperation of the community. For example, the Taliban 
routinely offers protection to communities in exchange for support in the struggle against 
GIROA/ISAF.50 Additionally, having a persistent, long-term presence in the community 
allows the Taliban to nurture these relationships. This is particularly important because, 
as stated in the literature review, it is not culturally inconsistent for alliances in 
Afghanistan to be transient. Therefore, having access to decision-making bodies gives the 
Taliban an important point through which to influence communities; a condition that is 
enabled by maintaining a local presence within rural Pashtun communities.  
The second reason why local strategies benefit the Taliban is that they better 
exploit the patron-client relationship inherent in rural Pashtun culture. Again, having 
direct access to rural Pashtun communities enables the Taliban to identify local clients 
dissatisfied with existing patrons. With the correct offer, the Taliban has the potential to 
gain their support with a package of inducements or threats, which was quite apparent in 
the early 1990s when the Taliban, having a sophisticated knowledge of local power 
structures, successfully convinced many community leaders that incorporating the 
growing movement into existing patron-client arrangements was in their best interests. In 
fact, during this time, the mere threat of the Taliban’s arrival often caused local leaders to 
reconsider existing patron-client arrangements.51 Furthermore, being embedded within 
the community over which the Taliban seeks to hold sway gives them a more refined 
assessment of what makes these inducements or threats effective, given local variables 
governing adaptation.  
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Given the benefits of the localized approach, the Taliban’s adoption of such a 
strategy is potentially problematic because it likely does not have the ability to embed 
fighters in every rural Pashtun community. The “neo-Taliban” is primarily comprised of 
decentralized and small units of fighters led by local leaders. Coordination between these 
leaders is typically sparse and governed by operational necessity.52 Compounding the 
limitations inherent in this condition of organizational fragmentation, the Taliban does 
not appear to possess sufficient numbers to control every community in rural Pashtun 
communities directly. Acknowledging these limitations associated with such estimates, a 
2007 intelligence estimate suggests that the Taliban is capable of fielding approximately 
10,000 fighters at any given time in Afghanistan.53 Given that many of these fighters are 
committed on only a part-time basis, it is reasonable to observe that since the Taliban 
does not possess the capacity to control every valley and community in rural Pashtun 
areas directly, it must achieve this control thorough indirect means.54 It follows, 
therefore, that the Taliban must carefully select the communities where its persistent 
presence can deliver the greatest benefit strategically.  
On the surface, it appears that the Taliban has been successful to this end. Since 
2002, the Taliban has demonstrated an ability to craft local alliances based upon a sound 
understanding of localized power politics. For example, it is common for the Taliban, 
seeking to expand its influence into an area, to approach village leaders marginalized by 
external entities, such as GIROA-backed strongmen or regional rivals. Since such leaders 
operate from a position of weakness, they are more likely to form alliances and share 
exploitable information about the local area with the Taliban.55 For example, resulting 
from Karzai’s post-2002 reorganization of power, the Noorzai tribe lost significant power 
to the Achakzais, setting off conflict in the affected areas. As the Taliban sought to regain 
the influence it lost at the hands of Coalition Forces (CF), it exploited this political strife 
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by siding with the Achakzais, gaining access to a stock of recruits.56 Still, the Taliban 
recognizes that there are basic problems with such an approach. At the most basic level, 
this leaves other rural areas largely open to the influence of GIROA/ISAF. Another 
possibility is that the Taliban could make a mistake, forming ill-conceived alliances with 
communities that yield no real benefit, or are counterproductive, ceding time and space 
for the GIROA/ISAF to implement effective information strategies in other areas.  
The second problem facing the Taliban is that, relative to ISAF, it lacks the 
capacity to marshal reconstruction and economic development resources for use in their 
own influence operations. During the formative years of the Taliban, the organization did 
not see the establishment of developmental or reconstructive activities as a relevant part 
of its campaign. Instead, its leaders focused upon the military campaign as the primary 
driver to establishing a support base in rural Pashtun areas.57  
Recently, however, the Taliban has demonstrated a willingness to employ other 
means through which to establish control over the population. In many areas, the Taliban 
has established a ‘shadow government’ that fills important voids created by the limited 
ability of the GIROA to quickly and efficiently address the grievances of the population 
and to enforce its own laws. For example, the Taliban’s willingness to serve as a fair and 
efficient arbiter of local disputes makes it a community asset. Being responsive (reaching 
arbiters is easy as making a phone call), not requiring an oath of allegiance, or demanding 
payment from affected parties, practices based upon Islamic principles, makes the 
Taliban an efficient source of justice and increases its legitimacy in the face of the 
populace.58 
The third problem facing the Taliban is that the effective command and control of 
its localized guerrilla campaign, heavily reliant upon its KBI, could be degraded by ISAF 
targeting. The Taliban’s organizational structure reflects a generally effective way to 
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balance the need to optimize efficiency through centralization and the need to adapt to 
local conditions through flexibility.59 Accordingly, village cells implement their local 
strategies without direct guidance from higher echelons of the Taliban’s leadership 
structure.60 Thruelsen observes that while local network commanders conceive and 
coordinate day-to-day operations, the role of high-level leadership structures, such as the 
Quetta Shura, provide broad guidance through its “shadow governors” responsible for 
insurgent actions in their respective areas.61  
Consequently, local commanders base day-to-day decisions upon their own 
environmental assessments and from knowledge about the local areas pooled within a 
KBI network. The Taliban’s KBI represents the primary means through which local 
commanders collaborate and communicate with one another and with higher-level 
leaders.62 Shahid, Samples, and Wood provide an effective diagram representative of a 
Taliban’s KBI in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2.  Reporting and Direction for Conduct of Coordinated Operations63 
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The ISAF/GIROA’s success in capturing or killing commanders who are part of 
this network has the potential to undermine the information strategy for three primary 
reasons. First, it breaks trusted and exclusive communication channels, something that 
takes time and effort for a new commander to establish. Second, it has the capacity to 
reduce the network’s cumulative stock of relevant information the Taliban can exploit in 
its information strategy. Third, successful targeting of seasoned commanders reduces the 
Taliban’s talent. Interestingly, Thruelsen observes that while the Taliban understands that 
the successful implementation of its decentralized guerrilla campaign is based upon the 
existence of coherent links between commanders at different levels, seamless connections 
are not always apparent, particularly in Southern Afghanistan.64  Therefore, the 
development of responsive links seems to represent a strategic dilemma for the Taliban. 
While reducing the probability that ISAF will illuminate its largely hidden network, the 
decentralized structure does not facilitate rapid communications from senior leaders to 
tactical commanders. 
2.  Prognosis 
As described in the literature review, the Taliban’s second framing task is the 
prognosis, the process by which it decides how to deal with the problems associated with 
localized information strategies. To deal with the problem, the Taliban appears to have 
adopted an operational approach that controls these areas by isolating them. This 
isolation has both a physical and informational dimension and is important to understand 
since it enables the Taliban to control most rural regions of Southern and Eastern 
Afghanistan indirectly.  
From an informational perspective, the Taliban has determined that disrupting and 
denying the rural population’s access to external sources of information will yield an 
operational advantage. Preventing the projection of ISAF/GIROA informational activities 
into these areas, in the view of the Taliban, will limit the range of popular responses to its 
lack of presence to satisfaction with the status quo.  
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For example, the Taliban has recently placed restrictions upon the use of cellular 
phones within many of these areas as a means to limit the population’s communications. 
At the provincial level, the Taliban sees two major problems with allowing cellular 
networks to operate uninterrupted. First, cell networks represent a rapid and inexpensive 
means through which ISAF and the GIROA can penetrate a community’s information 
environment. By coordinating this “information blockade,” the Taliban is postured to 
sustain an information advantage within the communities it controls because its narrative 
of violence would be unopposed.65 Second, it fears that community members possessing 
cellular phones could provide ISAF with valuable intelligence through “tip lines.” Third, 
the Taliban fears that beneficial reconstruction projects could cause the populace to 
develop positive, or at least neutral, feeling toward ISAF, GIROA, or developmental 
organizations.66  
A survey of open-source material suggests that in some regions of Afghanistan, 
the Taliban views cellular phone technology with some ambivalence. The Taliban’s 
imposition of a nighttime ban on cell phone usage in some parts of the country appears to 
be a result of two operational considerations. First, it is deemed a necessary measure to 
prevent members of the populace from contacting ISAF “tip lines.”67 Second, Talibs 
likely recognize that cellular technology provides ISAF with a responsive channel for 
information engagement with key communicators and members of the larger populace, 
discussed in more detail in the following section. Simply stated, a community’s inability 
to access external information sources leaves the Taliban’s narrative of violence 
unchecked, making the population less likely to do accept anything other than the status 
quo.  
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The second problem facing the Taliban is that, relative to ISAF, it lacks the 
capacity to marshal reconstruction and economic development resources for use in its 
own influence operations. Since ISAF will likely initiate a phased withdraw in 2014, the 
Taliban has determined that focusing its resources on efforts that undermine the GIROA 
will be more effective in securing the population’s compliance than offering 
developmental inducements. Informational indicators from the rural Pashtun 
communities suggest that this approach is working. For example, a 2006 National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) survey indicates that popular support for the Taliban in 
rural areas, passive and active, is primarily a function of government failure. In fact, the 
report’s conclusion offers that the most important requirement countering the Taliban in 
rural Pashtun areas is the development of a competent and trusted network of government 
and security force officials to spearhead initiatives that benefit the population.68 This 
critical shortcoming is even more critical at the district level, the most visible branch of 
government to rural Pashtun communities. Overwhelmingly, district-level governments 
are dysfunctional across Afghanistan.69 Other important factors that the Taliban exploit 
in rural Pashtun areas to undermine the GIROA include unemployment and anger of the 
death of local villagers at the hands of ISAF/ANSF (Afghanistan National Security 
Forces).70 Therefore, the Taliban believes that selectively promoting disorder among the 
population will continue to generate discontent with the GIROA.  
The third problem facing the Taliban is that the effective command and control of 
the localized guerrilla campaign, heavily reliant upon a KBI, could be degraded by ISAF 
targeting. The author uncovered no open-source evidence that suggests that the Taliban’s 
senior leadership is loosening existing restrictions upon the use of information systems 
technology as a means of enhancing command and control over local commanders. As 
seen in the following section, in fact, available evidence suggests that the Taliban’s  
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restrictions on the use of these systems are becoming increasingly apparent. Simply 
stated, the Taliban views the use of these systems as a threat to its knowledge-based 
infrastructure.  
Instead, Taliban operational patterns suggest that the development of an appealing 
jihadi ideology represents the most effective means of guiding the decentralized 
implementation of local information strategies. While much of the population’s support 
of the Taliban springs from GIROA failures, insurgent leaders appear to be largely driven 
by ideology.71 Since the Taliban’s strategy is local, the movement’s survival is dependent 
upon the support and commitment of its local commanders to continue to fight. 
Historically, the Taliban sought to sustain its traditional, rural ideology against liberal, 
urban values to maintain the loyalty of its local and area commanders.72 Recently, a new 
generation of fighters and commanders, educated in madrassas in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan over the past several years, has emerged. Referred to as the “neo-Taliban,” 
these leaders, having been rigorously indoctrinated into the organization’s Deobandic and 
rural narrative, are better equipped to independently coordinate their local campaigns 
within the confines of the Taliban’s ideal of a jihadi ideology.73 
3.  Motivation 
As described in the literature review, the Taliban’s third framing task is to 
motivate, the process by which it influences the population through its information 
strategy. For the purposes of this study, the author does not provide an exhaustive list of 
techniques that Taliban employs to achieve its objectives. Since 2001, the Taliban has 
employed a broad range of influence activities whose description would exceed the scope 
of this study. Instead, he only highlights those techniques the Taliban uses to confront the 
specific problems this study associates with the diagnosis and prognosis processes.  
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a. Violence and Coercion 
The Taliban has historically used violence and coercion as a means to 
control the population, a trend likely to continue. In 1998 alone, the Taliban reportedly 
killed 4,000 Afghans as it sought to secure bases of support in rural Pashtun areas.74 A 
recent UN report estimates that the Taliban was responsible for the deaths of 76% of the 
Afghan civilians killed in the first six months of 2010, an increase from 53% in 2009. 
Additionally, the study shows that executions over the same time period had increased by 
95% since last year, a powerful indication that the Taliban’s campaign of violence against 
the population is deliberate.75 This data, coupled with the ISAF’s recent interception of 
an operational directive authored by Mullah Omar ordering his commanders to execute 
any Afghan man or woman guilty of collaboration with ISAF, clearly shows how the 
Taliban integrate the use of military operations and information to instill a controlling 
sense of fear over the population..76  
b. Isolate Rural Pashtun Communities 
The Taliban’s isolation of rural Pashtun areas has both an informational 
and social dimension. Evidence shows that the Taliban goes to great efforts to deny the 
population’s access to information. For example, the Taliban has actively sought to limit 
the population’s access to the cellular phone network. Since, as described in the previous 
section, the Taliban considers the population’s cell phone use to be an operational threat, 
their initial reaction has been to use coercive tactics directed at the populace and mobile 
service operators (MSOs).77 For example, in some areas, the Taliban has eliminated all 
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cell phone communications in an area by destroying towers.78 Additionally, it has 
influenced mobile service operators, such as Roshan, to shut off towers during select 
hours of the day, either through bribery or through threats of violence against the 
population.79  
Another example of how the Taliban has restricted access to the 
population’s access to information relates to the Internet. When the Taliban controlled 
Afghanistan from 1996–2001, it outlawed the use of the Internet.80 Fearing that popular 
access to “vulgar, immoral, and anti-Islamic” information would constitute a threat to 
state security, the Taliban’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice 
enforced this ban until the regime’s collapse in 2001.81  
However, since being driven from power by the U.S.-led coalition nearly a 
decade ago, the Taliban has changed its position on the Internet out of operational 
necessity. Understanding that they are facing a counterinsurgency effort and face the 
prospects of a long-term campaign to seize power, the Taliban appears to see the value of 
the Internet as a platform from which to shape its narrative, gain financial support, and 
inspire recruits.82  
The author found no open-source evidence that suggests that the Taliban 
are punishing members of rural Pashtun communities for using the Internet. Two factors 
suggest that the Taliban is not expressly restricting the population’s use of the Internet 
today. First, the GIROA has enacted a series of Internet filtering policies against websites 
that are “immoral” and represent a threat to “traditional Afghan society.” Additionally, 
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these filtering initiatives do not allow Afghans to access Gmail, Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube because the GIROA considers them to facilitate Taliban operations.83  
Second, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter V of this study, other 
considerations hinder the rural population’s access to the Internet. For example, 
impoverished members of rural Pashtun communities do not possess the capacity to pay 
the recurring costs of Internet service. Additionally, the growth of cyber-cafes in urban 
areas, such as Kandahar and Kabul, springs from a cultural preference for interpersonal 
interaction and group-usage of Internet Communications Technologies (ICT). Since rural 
Pashtun communities typically do not possess such facilities, it is unlikely that Internet 
usage would be widespread there.84 Therefore, since the Taliban is now using the Internet 
as a system through which to disseminate propaganda, the GIROA have largely restricted 
its availability, and socio-economic conditions in rural Pashtun villages naturally inhibit 
its usage, it does not seem profitable for the Taliban to ban the use of the Internet 
expressly in areas in control.  
The Taliban’s informational blockade of rural Pashtun communities also 
has a social dimension. The Taliban appear to have implemented a coercive and violent 
strategy to weaken tribal and local structures. Since 2001, the Taliban have assassinated 
hundreds of tribal leaders to discourage community leadership structures from 
galvanizing opposition to the Taliban’s local strategy.85 From the Taliban’s perspective, 
the primary benefit of such a strategy is that it often encourages tribal leaders to flee their 
communities, creating a leadership vacuum that the Taliban can exploit. For example, the 
Taliban recently delivered 50 “night letters” ordering tribal leaders in Eastern 
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Afghanistan to flee to Pakistan or face the prospects of assassination.86 In 2009, the 
Taliban successfully implemented such a strategy in Pakistan, brutally suppressing tribal 
efforts to form lashkars (tribal militias). Interestingly, one reason attributed to the tribes’ 
lack of success to this end was their inability to communicate and coordinate with other 
communities.87 This example shows the benefits that the Taliban’s isolation of 
communities can deliver in implementing its local strategy.  
c. Disrupt Reconstruction and Economic Development to 
Undermine the GIROA 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Taliban has overcome its 
inability, relative to its competitors, to marshal sufficient resources needed to deliver 
economic incentives to the population by undermining and disrupting ISAF/GIROA 
reconstruction efforts. The Taliban’s persistent violence has been a major factor in 
disrupting the successful implementation of ISAF reconstruction efforts, particularly in 
eastern and southern Afghanistan. For example, as of May 2010, ISAF spent $1.5 million 
of the $19.5 million it committed to reconstruction and development in Marjah due to a 
recent surge in Taliban violence and intimidation.88  
However, evidence shows that the Taliban understand that such a strategy 
contains risks. Last year’s Taliban “Rules and Regulations for Mujahidin,” clearly shows 
that its provincial leadership possesses the authority in deciding to attack, capture, and 
destroy reconstruction equipment projects or equipment.89 The existence of this decision-
making process to regulate the effects of its operations shows that the Taliban  
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acknowledge the risks associated with alienating the populace with its policies regarding 
reconstruction projects. Therefore, it would be simplistic to characterize the Taliban’s 
strategic influence objectives as purely coercive. 
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III. THE TALIBAN’S INFORMATION STRATEGY AND SOCIAL 
ADAPTATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the Taliban’s information strategy 
affects the factors governing social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities. Building 
upon the descriptive analysis provided in Chapter II of this study, the author evaluates 
how the Taliban’s rural strategy (IV #1) positively or negatively impacts four factors 
governing adaptation: economic utility, informational reach, patronage, and safety. This 
analysis will set conditions for hypothesis testing in Chapter VII.  
B.  ECONOMIC UTILITY 
Research supporting this study shows that with the exception of poppy cultivation 
in specific areas, the Taliban’s information strategy does not deliver economic benefits 
that will improve the population’s economic utility. As previously mentioned, the Taliban 
uses violence to isolate rural communities and undermine ISAF/GIROA’s reconstruction 
strategy. This strategy has three target audiences. First, the Taliban frequently targets 
Afghans working for nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to discourage their support of 
reconstruction projects. In 2009, the Taliban killed roughly 30 Afghans suspected of 
assisting NGOs.90 Second, the Taliban use similar tactics to discourage foreigners in 
NGOs from completing projects. Since January 2010, the Taliban have conducted 76 
attacks on NGO workers in Afghanistan, 15 of which were abductions. In turn, several 
NGOs have stopped applying for USAID grants, seeking support from other sources.91 
Third, the Taliban destroy and deny the population’s access to reconstruction projects. 
For example, the Taliban’s cell phone policies, described in the previous section, have 
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denied over 300,000 subscribers full-time service.92 Given the cellular phone network’s 
capacity to generate economic development and jobs in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s 
cellular phone strategy, similar to other efforts to disrupt reconstruction, will negatively 
impact the population’s economic utility.  
While the Taliban’s use of violence to isolate rural communities economically 
could have a negative impact on economic utility in many places, in areas where poppy is 
grown and cultivated, its impact could be quite different. For years, Afghanistan has been 
the world’s greatest producer of illicit opium poppies. Since seizing control of 
Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban’s relationship with poppy has changed in response to 
environmental conditions. A valuable source of ushr (agricultural tax) and the zakat 
(income tax) for the new regime, the Taliban initially permitted the cultivation and trade 
of poppy.93 Increased international pressure compelled the Taliban to reverse this policy 
in 2000, making the cultivation of poppy illegal which, coupled with a major drought, 
caused a remarkable 94% decrease in Afghanistan’s overall opium production. The 
Taliban’s failure to provide alternatives caused significant hardships in rural areas 
previously reliant upon poppy cultivation.94  
While the Interim Government of Afghanistan’s 2002 ban was similar in scope to 
the Taliban’s just two years prior, opium production has steadily increased. As part of its 
reemergence in 2006, the Taliban demonstrated great strategic flexibility by reversing 
their position on opium production. This provided three important operational benefits. 
First, it allowed the Taliban to frame themselves as protectors of rural farmers suffering 
the oppression of the GIROA who, at the same time, was embarking upon an aggressive 
eradication program.95 The second benefit is that opium is the Taliban’s most important 
source of funding. For example, a 2008 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
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Crime estimates that that Taliban earned approximately $500 million from opium 
production in Afghanistan.96 Finally, in light of the government’s eradication efforts, the 
Taliban generates popular support from the friction created between the ISAF/GIROA 
and local farmers.97  
While poppy cultivation and production enables the Taliban to impact economic 
utility positively in some rural Pashtun areas, similar effects are not observed in most 
parts of eastern and southern Afghanistan. First, as Figure 3.1 shows, rural communities 
in several provinces in the Pashtun regions of eastern Afghanistan do not see economic 
benefits of poppy cultivation.98 Therefore, in provinces, such as Paktika, Paktya, Khost, 
and Logar, predominantly rural Pashtun regions, the Taliban’s economic strategy seems 
to have a negative impact upon economic utility.  
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Figure 3.1. Opium Cultivation 2009 (By Province)99 
C.  SAFETY 
A community’s sense of safety is an important variable governing social 
adaptation in rural Pashtun communities. While plenty of data exists that highlights the 
challenges of the current Afghan environment, it would be helpful to evaluate how these 
challenges affect decision making in rural Pashtun communities.100 First, rural Pashtun 
populations, particularly those in areas contested by the Taliban and ISAF, are hesitant to 
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facilitate the completion of reconstruction projects out of fear of retribution. Recently, the 
Taliban’ retributive killings against Marjah citizens participating in various community 
improvement initiatives have slowed the progress of reconstruction there.101 
Additionally, many Afghans sense that ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan will happen 
soon, making any support of its efforts a risky endeavor in the face of a resurgent 
Taliban.102 
D.  INFORMATIONAL REACH 
The Taliban appears to believe that the best way to expand its informational reach 
into rural Pashtun communities is not through new media, but through traditional forms 
of communication. Face-to-face communications are central to the Taliban’s information 
strategy. Often meeting with tribal elders, local leaders, and members of the community 
suspected of cooperating with ISAF/GIROA, the Taliban understand that face-to-face 
meetings are the most culturally relevant means of persuading the population to comply 
with its policies.103  
Another traditional form of communication the Taliban employs to maximize 
informational reach in rural Pashtun communities is the night letter (shabnamah). 
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targets or to communities as a whole.104 A useful advantage that shabnamah gives the 
Taliban is that unlike most mass-produced ISAF psychological warfare (PSYOP) 
products, night letters are tailored to local conditions.105  
Another important and culturally relevant means of distributing messages to rural 
populations, audiocassettes have proven to be a highly effective medium through which 
to disseminate messages. Often incorporating songs, poetry, and framed with 
religious/nationalistic themes, Taliban cassette recordings have the capacity to generate 
audiences because they take make full use of common cultural and religious connections 
between rural Pashtun audiences and the Taliban. As previously discussed, having access 
to these social endowments gives the Taliban a necessary but not sufficient advantage 
over ISAF when engaging the Pashtun population.106  
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, a close historical and cultural 
connection to radio exists in Pashtun society. Simply stated, radio is the most prevalent 
medium in rural Pashtun Afghanistan and the Taliban’s commitment to communicating 
with the population is central to the effective implementation of its local information 
strategy.107 Since less than 25% of Afghanistan’s population is literate, it comes as no 
surprise that almost 90% of Afghan homes have radios.108 Consequently, the Taliban’s 
clandestine FM radio platforms are custom-made for their localized information strategy. 
Costing only $200 (transmitter, amplifier, and car battery), the clandestine radio stations 
are a cost-effective way of disseminating short-range propaganda across rural and  
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illiterate villages.109 Additionally, since many villages in rural areas have few, if any, 
sources of electrical power, battery-operated or crank-handled emergency FM radio 
receivers are sometimes the only viable source of external information.110  
Given these considerations and a historical record of success, it is easy to see how 
FM radio is important to the Taliban’s local information strategy. The Taliban were 
successful in generating audiences in rural Pashtun communities in Pakistan’s Swat 
Valley by inciting fear through makeshift FM radio platforms. For example, the Taliban 
routinely issued decrees against individuals and issued summons to trial under Sharia 
Law through FM radio. When the members of the population failed to appear before the 
Taliban’s court, local fighters executed them or members of their family.111 
Consequently, this incentivized listenership in local villages, making the Taliban’s radio 
broadcasting a very important fixture of daily life in rural Swat villages.112  
Similarly, in rural Pashtun Afghanistan, the Taliban have employed makeshift FM 
radio platforms to disseminate many of these same themes to generate local audiences. 
Since 1996, the Taliban used radio to disseminate sermons and propaganda in eastern and 
southern Afghanistan as a means through which to control the population.113 After 2001, 
in an effort to localize its radio campaigns while avoiding ISAF detection, the Taliban 
have become increasingly reliant upon mobile, makeshift radio stations. Recent estimates 
show that as many as 150 of these Taliban stations operate in the Pashtun tribal areas of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.114 Aside from giving the Taliban a platform from which to 
disseminate messages, these mobile stations provide an important psychological benefit. 
Since these stations have a range of about 2 km, the dissemination of messages serves to 
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remind the population that the Taliban are operating in the area and have the ability to 
respond quickly to any signs on non-compliance. Similar to night letters, these stations 
are important to the Taliban because they are the perfect tools through which to achieve 
near-term psychological warfare objectives in rural areas it does not directly control.115  
Its repressive cellular phone policy notwithstanding, the Taliban have exploited 
cellular phone networks as a platform from which to disseminate propaganda and 
threatening messages. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV, the cellular phone 
industry in Afghanistan is the most rapidly growing sector of the nation’s economy. 
Currently, there are over 10 million cellular phone network customers in Afghanistan, a 
figure that has rapidly increased since the 2002 introduction of the networks into the 
country. Experts predict that the country will continue to see growth in this sector in the 
coming years.116 Additionally, Afghanistan’s Global Systems for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) provides coverage to many Pashtun areas in eastern and 
southern Afghanistan (Figure 3.2).  
Since the 2002 establishment of the cellular network in Afghanistan, the Taliban 
have largely limited the use of this messaging platform to send threatening texts.117 
However, reports that the Taliban have used cellular phones to send threatening voice 
phone calls to influential tribal elders also exist. Given low levels of literacy in rural 
Pashtun areas, voice messages will be effective in rapidly influencing decision makers.118 
Recently, the Taliban have increasingly sent such messages to members of the populace 
in Kandahar to discourage cooperation with ISAF and GIROA forces they expect will 
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increase their presence in the city.119 Additionally, the Taliban have employed “jihadi 
ringtones” to inspire fighters and enhance recruiting in Pakistan and Afghanistan.120  
 
 
Figure 3.2. GSM Coverage Afghanistan, 2010121 
Given the size of Afghanistan’s cellular phone network and its potential for 
increased growth, the Taliban’s use of GSM technology to distribute propaganda 
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represents an effort to improve its informational reach to the population. However, the 
author’s research uncovered no evidence that the Taliban uses cellular phone technology 
to disseminate public information or create economic development opportunities for the 
populace. Considered with the Taliban’s imposition of usage restrictions upon the 
population, these aspects of the Taliban’s strategy partially offset this gain because they 
reduce economic utility. The degree to which this condition benefits or hurts the Taliban 
is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.  
Research in support of this study shows that the Internet is not an important part 
of the Taliban’s localized information strategy in rural Pashtun communities. While the 
neo-Taliban have embraced the Internet as a channel through which to undermine the 
GIROA, disseminate propaganda, conduct recruitment activities, and support senior 
leadership communications, it has not used the web as a tool to influence target audiences 
in rural Pashtun communities. As previously mentioned, high rates of illiteracy and a lack 
of consistent power sources conspire to make the rural information environment not 
susceptible to web-based influence operations.122  
An important relationship also exists between honor/shame and a community’s 
need for information. While variables governing a community leader’s sensibilities are 
dependent upon local conditions, broad aspects of the Taliban’s information strategy can 
have both a positive and negative effect upon rural Pashtun senses of honor/shame. First, 
as discussed in the previous section, the Taliban’s strategy of isolation has the potential to 
impact a leader’s sense of honor negatively. For example, Thruelsen observes that the 
prestige and honor of Pashtun leaders and the Taliban is built upon access to information 
and networks.123 According to McAllister, formal and informal communications 
networks represent the means through which tribal elders typically communicate with 
one another and with external entities. Interestingly, he suggests that back-channel 
communications are used to pass sensitive information between leaders when they 
believe formal communications networks have been compromised or are not supporting 
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the delivery of messages to intended targets for coordinated action.124 Since, as described 
in Chapter I, a community leader’s status is governed by his ability to provide services 
for the community and because it is not culturally inconsistent for inter-tribe allegiances 
to morph into segmentation, the Taliban’s informational isolation of rural areas has the 
potential to impact a community leaders’ sensibility of honor/shame negatively. 
E.  PATRONAGE 
The Taliban’s information strategy appears to have a positive impact upon the 
establishment of patronage networks it needed to control rural Pashtun communities, 
particularly in areas where ISAF/GIROA presence is sparse. As identified earlier in 
Chapter I, the patron-client relationship is the basis of many strategic alliances in 
Afghanistan. Since 1994, the Taliban has gained the cooperation of many villages in 
exchange for services, such as protection and economic benefits. Given the number of 
social endowments the Taliban share with rural Pashtun communities, they possess an 
important advantage in establishing these networks.  
However, a few factors constrain the Taliban’s ability to manipulate kinship 
networks in rural Pashtun areas as a means to influence the population. First, a key 
characteristic of such arrangements is that they last only as long as the patron is capable 
of providing the service.125 This point seems valid since, as explained in Chapter I, 
alliances within rural Pashtun tribal structures are fluid. Therefore, the only permanent 
characteristic of patronage networks in these communities is the framework through 
which services and resources flow. Second, Thruelsen observes that while each area is 
unique, as a general rule, the Taliban do not adopt this practice in areas directly contested 
by ISAF/GIROA. Instead, the Taliban emphasizes its strategy of violence and coercion to 
gain at least the passive support of the population. Conversely, the Taliban typically enter 
into patronage agreements with the population in areas where ISAF forces seldom 
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operate.126 Time appears to be the critical factor that explains this distinction. McAlister 
observes that patron-client relationships, even under perfect conditions, take time to 
develop in Afghanistan largely because they require multiple meetings and confidence 
building measures.127 A persistent ISAF/GIRO presence could inhibit the Taliban’s 
freedom of movement in an area, making it more difficult for them to conduct enough 
negotiations with community leaders that lead to the establishment of a patron-client 
relationship. Third, with the important exception of the poppy trade, the Taliban’s 
information strategy does not appear to have a positive impact economically in rural 
Pashtun communities.   
Therefore, the Taliban’s information strategy will likely have a positive impact on 
the establishment of a patronage network in areas marked by high levels of poppy 
cultivation/production and low levels of ISAF activity. As the UNODC’s 2010 Winter 
Rapid Assessment shows (Figure 3.3), most areas of Pashtun Afghanistan have non-
permissive security environments and only three provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, and 
Laghman) are not “poppy free.” Even in these environments, there are no guarantees that 
the Taliban’s alliances based upon patronage are permanent or grounded in ideology. 
Instead, the evidence presented thus far in this study suggests that the most important 
considerations affecting the maintenance of patron-client relationships are security and 
economic utility.  
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Figure 3.3. Provincial Security Assessment (as of January 2010 vs. Opium 
Cultivation)128  
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IV. EXPANSION OF CELLULAR PHONE NETWORK 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the expansion or introduction of a 
cellular phone network will impact social adaptation in Afghanistan’s rural Pashtun 
communities. First, the author briefly describes the state of the cellular phone network in 
Afghanistan. Second, he evaluates how this study’s recommended expansion of the 
cellular phone network into rural Pashtun communities (IV #2) might positively or 
negatively impact the four factors governing adaptation: economic utility, informational 
reach, patronage, and safety. This analysis set conditions for hypothesis testing in 
Chapter VI.  
B.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE #2: CELLULAR PHONE NETWORK 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Since 2002, the growth of cellular phone technology in Afghanistan has been a 
notable developmental success. Today, there are an estimated 12.5 million cellular phone 
users in Afghanistan, a figure that lies just below half of the population.129 A 2009 Asia 
Foundation study shows that in Afghanistan, 44% of rural homes possess at least one cell 
phone. Similarly, this same study shows that 11% of Afghans report that they receive 
news and information by SMS at least once per week. A World Bank study shows that 
the projected market for mobile applications in all forms could be $30 million by 2015, a 
figure that policy analyst Siddharta Raja suggests is conservative.130  
As explained in Chapter III, cellular phone networks represent both an asset and a 
liability to the Taliban. While cellular phones provide the Taliban with a means by which 
to communicate, their imposition of a nighttime ban on usage in some parts of the 
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country appears to be a result of two operational considerations. First, it is deemed a 
necessary measure to prevent members of the populace from contacting ISAF “tip 
lines.”131 Second, it likely recognizes that cellular technology provides ISAF with a 
responsive channel for information engagement with key communicators and members of 
the larger populace. Since the Taliban considers these vulnerabilities to be an operational 
threat, its initial reaction has been to use coercive tactics directed at the populace and 
mobile service operators to limit cellular phone use.132 The author uncovered no research 
data that described the means by which the Taliban detects violations of its cellular phone 
usage bans.  However, it is reasonable to conclude that since the Taliban’s local cells live 
among the population, they could observe community members flouting bans.  At the 
local level, this will result in threats and violence.  As local cells report patterns of 
misconduct through the Taliban’s network of commanders (discussed in chapter II), 
higher-level coercion of mobile service companies will likely follow.   
From the perspective of the GIROA, ISAF, and NGOs, the expansion of cellular 
phone infrastructure represents an opportunity to bring economic and social benefits to 
the population. As described in more detail later in this chapter, from an economic 
perspective, cellular phone networks can generate and circulate cash. For example, the 
implementation of mobile banking (m-banking) program has the potential to provide 
improved access to cash for the poorest members of the communities.133 From a social 
perspective, cellular phones transmit information that creates and reinforces social 
networks. Additionally, other social benefits of cellular phone networks include having 
responsive means by which to transmit and receive public information between the 
government. As shown in the following sections, market pricing, farming reports,  
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weather, medical advice, and emergency broadcasting represent a mere fraction of the 
types of public information programs that can facilitate development and help a 
community function.  
C.  ECONOMIC UTILITY 
Dispersed communities linked by poor communications and sparse transportation 
infrastructure create inefficiencies in market functions that preclude the poorest of the 
poor from ever realizing real profit.134 Simply stated, market information drives effective 
decision making for every entity along a supply chain including farmers and consumers. 
As seen in Chapter II, the Taliban’s information strategy is built upon the need to isolate 
communities. Therefore, for cellular phone networks to increase economic utility in rural 
Pashtun communities, it would have to break the Taliban’s informational “blockade.”  
Cellular phone-base economic development programs have been implemented in 
other countries to help community members break out of economic isolation. For 
example, Manobi, in coordination with the Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture, has 
implemented a cellular phone-based delivery system that disseminated pricing 
information on fruits and vegetable.135 Similarly, Esoko coordinates programs that 
provide information about the cost of agricultural goods for farmers and traders wanting 
to buy or sell commodities in Rwanda.136 Both of these systems have helped farmers in 
these respective regions obtain better prices for their crops.  
Similar programs could have like effects in rural Pashtun communities, almost all 
of which have agrarian economies or are reliant upon distant markets for food purchases. 
In fact, some Afghan farmers are already using cell phones to check market prices before 
making the trip into town.137 To expand this service to more areas, Roshan and the U.S. 
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Government have partnered to create a national price information system providing 
farmers, brokers, intermediaries, and wholesalers with access to market information on 
25 commodities in 11 Provinces.138  
There are two important benefits of such a program. First, given the expense of 
fuel and security concerns associated with movement in rural Pashtun areas, travelling to 
market brings considerable overhead costs for isolated communities. Price information 
programs reduce unnecessary trips to market and reduce overhead because the only cost 
incurred is price of making phone call or sending a text message. Second, by giving 
Pashtun famers and consumers timely access commodity prices, they naturally have more 
leverage during price negotiations. 
There are also important limitations inherent to implementing such programs in 
rural Pashtun communities. First, according to United States Agency for International 
Development representative Margaret Orwig, while this program generates about 1,400-
1,500 SMS messages on a bi-weekly basis in Afghanistan, the overwhelming majority of 
these messages are between a relatively small number of traders.139 Consequently, under 
current conditions, it is unlikely that farmers in rural Pashtun communities would realize 
the benefits of this program. A possible workaround for this problem would involve 
implementing a local scheme that not only informs farmers about the program, but also 
guides them through the entire process, helping them realize the benefits first-hand. Such 
an approach would have to be done through intermediaries or a trained core of 
community members who could oversee progress. Another important limitation, 
illiteracy, is discussed later in this section.  
Other cellular phone-based programs have the capacity to increase economic 
utility in rural Pashtun communities by increasing the population’s accessibility to cash. 
For example, m-banking has the potential to make the repayment of micro-loans and the 
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distribution of payments easier than other options available to the population in some 
“unbanked” areas. Current programs in Afghanistan include M-PESA, a mobile phone-
based currency transfer that has been used in the country since 2008. While the primary 
benefit of this program is to increase liquidity within rural communities, another 
advantage is that it allows users to transmit or receive money for any reason, reducing the 
risks and costs associated with transportation. Additionally, it makes it easier for the 
population to access and pay-off micro-finance institutions (MFI) and settle debts with 
small businesses serving as M-PESA agents. An example of a small business M-PESA 
agent currently operating in Afghanistan includes Roshan vendors, whose customers can 
purchase mobile phone minutes remotely. This technology also has potential relevance 
for users seeking access to vendors in distribution networks, such as petrol stations, 
supermarkets, and other small businesses.140  
M-banking can also help members of rural Pashtun communities to see more 
money than current money transfer schemes permit. First, M-PESA allows the user to 
bypass extra charges associated with the hawala system, which can range anywhere from 
5%–15%.141 Second, moving cash through cellular phones has the potential to cut off 
corruption chains marred by kickbacks and skimming. The direct distribution of cash to 
the user bypasses these chains, allowing people at the end of the chain to realize greater 
financial benefit.  
This program is particularly relevant for the distribution of salaries and has 
already been implemented in parts of Afghanistan. For example, a joint anti-corruption 
initiative between the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A), 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) recently concluded a 
nine-month trial period where 53 Afghan National Police (ANP) successfully received 
salary distributions at the beginning of the monthly pay period. The MoI later expanded 
this service to ANP units in Wardak and Khost Provinces, paying an additional 204 
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police officers by cellular phone.142 This service negates the use of ANP trusted agents 
that physically move cash from banks at provincial capitals to distribution centers at 
district offices, a critical node in the chain of corruption. Another interesting application 
of this program could involve paying tribal militia (arbakai) as part of a Village Stability 
Program. Historically, government salary distributions to arbakai have been unreliable 
and irregular.143 Possessing a routinized payment program would not only sustain the 
morale of the arbakai, but would reduce the probability that the militia would steal from 
the population.  
Another variation of the m-banking platform is through electronically topping up 
(E-TOPUP) usage balances. Specifically, this occurs when users can transfer cash credits 
from their pre-paid account balance to other phones via SMS or Unstructured 
Supplementary Service Data (USSD).144 Interestingly, this capability has created a 
growing new trade economy in countries like Bangladesh, Nigeria, South Africa, and the 
Philippines. Roshan already has this program operating in Afghanistan.145 This platform 
could be particularly useful for rural Afghans heavily reliant upon credit at the bazaar. 
Typically, rural Afghans are unable to stock food, fuel, and fodder and are reliant upon 
credit to sustain their families during seasonal food shortages. In Afghan culture, the best 
measure of creditworthiness is the borrower’s reputation for making timely payments.146 
Having the ability to pay the creditor using the e-topup platform or m-banking allows the 
borrower to pay the creditor on time without having to leave the village.  
Again, these platforms carry important limitations. First, the cost of mobile 
phones could be prohibitive for Afghan households, whose average yearly income is 
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approximately $300.147 The author’s research shows that the average cellular phone and 
SIM card in Afghanistan costs between $11 and $30.148 For the poorest members of rural 
communities, this represents a significant investment. Second, as seen with price 
information programs, these applications require the user not only to understand how to 
use the hardware, but also to understand how the overall program can bring benefits. 
Third, as Jay Schaffner, DoD Senior Advisor for Science and Technology suggests, a 
population unfamiliar with this technology is vulnerable to the criminal commoditization 
of information.149 For example, criminal networks or corrupt intermediaries could use 
social engineering techniques to manipulate financial transactions. Clearly, such activity 
could undermine cellular phone money transfer platforms.  
These limitations can be partially mitigated by a combination of technical and 
educational solutions. First, a technical solution would be to secure mobile money with 
“Know Your Client” (KYC) and digital encryption to ensure payments are matched with 
correct recipients.150 For example, some KYC encryption schemes involve user 
passwords to transmit money and to access balances. Others include programming 
varying levels of user rights for different actions.151 However, as the author discusses in 
the next section, advanced user applications are difficult to implement in rural Afghan 
communities because of illiteracy and related low levels of technical competence.  
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D.  SAFETY 
The expansion of a cellular phone network into rural Pashtun communities can 
positively impact its sense of safety. The first benefit is connected to a community 
member’s adoption of m-banking. By not having to transport cash physically or having to 
travel along dangerous roads to pay a creditor at a market, community members could 
use cellular phones to reduce their exposure to harm. 
Second, the expansion of the cellular phone network has the potential to improve 
public health in rural communities. Most rural Pashtun villages live below the poverty 
line and do not have access to basic healthcare. While it is difficult to get anything other 
than the most basic medical service outside of Kabul, formal healthcare facilities are 
almost non-existent in rural areas. Similarly, a poor telecommunications infrastructure 
has hindered communication between the Afghan Ministry of Health, provincial/district 
governments, and NGOs.152 Consequently, rural communities are susceptible to serious 
health problems. For example, Afghanistan’s infant mortality rates are among the highest 
in the world. Similarly, diarrhea, respiratory infections, malaria, and malnutrition rank 
among the common ailments resulting in fatalities in rural Pashtun communities.153 
Electronic consultation (e-consultation) represents an excellent cellular-phone 
based program to impact public health positively in rural Pashtun communities. Such 
programs have been successful in other parts of the world. For example, mobile phones 
are used to combat outbreaks or epidemics, such as malaria, in South Africa. As part of 
the program, patients can access medical advice and receive phone numbers to call for 
additional assistance. Additionally, nurses send SMS messages to remind patients in 
remote locations to take medicines.154  
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Similar programs in Afghanistan could be valuable for rural Pashtun populations. 
Conceivably, patients could call a 24-hour phone system and describe their particular 
health concern. The system could conceivably route the patients to “on call” doctors who 
could provide pro bono advice to needy patients. For example, the World Bank’s 
Siddharta Raja describes a scheme where a health hotline connects midwives in rural 
Afghan villages with medical experts throughout the country. Since the country has only 
about 200 OBGYNs, cellular phone penetration into rural Afghan villages provides an 
otherwise impossible benefit.155  
Third, the expansion of the cellular phone network has the potential to enhance 
communications during a time of crisis. For example, cellular phones can serve as a 
channel for emergency broadcast system information. The Afghan Natural Disaster 
Management Authority (ANDA) can enhance its response to natural disaster by 
proactively distributing “aftershock” warnings to communities connected by the cellular 
phone network. Additionally, it can use the network to disseminate public information 
and to coordinate relief efforts with community leaders.156  
E.  INFORMATIONAL REACH 
Perhaps the most important benefit that the expansion of the cellular network can 
bring lies in its capacity to improve communications within and accelerate the creation of 
cooperative links between social networks. Naturally, this will only happen if the target 
audience realizes the potential that cellular phones have in providing informational 
benefits. Jake Schaffner, a DoD Senior Advisor for Science and Technology, observes 
that applying western concepts of networking in Afghanistan are prone to failure. Instead, 
the effective introduction of cellular phone programs in Afghanistan must carefully 
consider user schemas that drive usage patterns.157 
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As mentioned in Chapter I, Afghans value their social networks. Having a cellular 
phone could reduce the time and distance an Afghan must invest to communicate with 
other members of his network. Cell phones can also enable users to develop numerous 
contacts over greater distances from their homes. As mentioned in Chapter II, possessing 
access to information and membership in networks plays an important role in rural 
Pashtun sensibilities of honor/shame.158 According to Khanjan, as a user’s casual 
friendships starts to build, villagers in remote locations often gain greater access to new 
resources and larger networks. Over time, the villager would become less reliant upon 
fraternal and local contacts.159 Considering these socio-cultural factors and the rapid 
growth of cellular phone networks in Afghanistan over the past several years, the 
introduction of cellular phone networks are not likely to reduce rural Pashtun access to 
information. Still, important limitations apply. 
For example, US Embassy officials project that the introduction of a mobile 
phone network could generate 80 million SMS or social network application text 
messages in the first year of operation. However, Issac Hazard, director of community 
consulting at Mzinga Incorporated observes that only 10 percent of any population uses 
social network media. Based upon the number of registered users in Afghanistan, each 
mobile phone owner would have sent over 800 messages per year.160 Katrin Verclass, 
Co-Founder and Editor of MobileActive.Org, suggests that anticipating immediate results 
from potential rural Afghan users is problematic. She explains that the major source of 
cellular phone network program failure in Afghanistan over the past nine years has been 
the false assumption that a direct relationship exists between the speed of network growth 
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and the speed of user-level innovation.161 Some important reasons exist as to why 
assumptions of rapid innovation in the wake of a cellular network expansion in rural 
Pashtun areas may be overoptimistic.  
First, most rural Afghans do not have regular access to electricity. Rural 
populations primarily depend upon traditional fuels, such as wood and crop residues for 
cooking and lighting.162 Since 2001, the number of Afghans with access to electricity has 
risen only slightly from 6% to 10%.163 Having a limited source of power forces users to 
adopt non-traditional means to charge their mobile phones, such as car batteries or 
charging carts in the nearest city.164 For the average member of a rural Afghan 
community, such options are not always readily available, forcing users to reserve mobile 
phone use for only the most critical of uses. Simply stated, such a condition does not 
accommodate the development of user-level innovations in mobile telephony. 
Second, prospective users in rural Pashtun communities are unlikely to be literate 
and possess the skills needed to exploit the potential of cellular phones fully. Jake 
Schaffner, DoD Senior Advisor for Science and Technology, emphasizes that simply 
establishing the network and expecting it to provide benefits will not work. Instead, a 
profitable effort will require a sustained commitment of time, money, and expertise in 
communities of interest. Specific points of investment include power supply, educational 
programs that teach Afghans how to improve their own network, and user training.165 
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Additionally, Siddharta Raja, a policy analyst at the World Bank, states that this user 
competence, particularly among women, is particularly low in rural Pashtun areas.166  
Ways exist in which agencies seeking to implement cellular phone-based 
programs in rural Afghanistan could mitigate these limitations. Merrick Schaefer, 
technical project manager for UNICEF, describes a possible workaround for users with 
low levels of skills and who are illiterate. For example, a capable user can communicate 
on behalf others, a form of asynchronous communications that has been widely practiced 
in developing economies of Africa.167 Implementing these practices would require 
information strategists to engage companies, such as Roshan and NGOs, to implement 
educational programs for rural Pashtun villages that create a core of local intermediaries 
who, in turn, can train other village members and women to use the network. This model 
ensures that Afghans teach other Afghans how to use the hardware. Additionally, this 
core of Afghans represents a network of users that developmental agencies can use as 
conduits to “push” new programs through. Finally, this core of users can communicate 
asynchronously with external agents on behalf of members of the community in need of 
an intermediary.  
Similarly, another possible workaround is the introduction of an Interactive Voice 
Response System (IVRS). According to Shainoor Khoja, Roshan implemented this 
program to allow users to access services through a voice-activated menu in Dari and 
Pashtun.168 Regarding the limitations of associated with the power problem, Khoia also 
suggests a community engagement strategy where the community, instead of external 
security organizations, secures towers. In such a scheme, Roshan would construct solar- 
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powered cellular phone towers in communities that agree to protect them. In return, the 
company would allocate excess power supplies to the community, providing it with a 
scarcely available resource.169 
F.  PATRONAGE 
The expansion of cellular phone networks into rural Pashtun communities can 
manipulate or reinforce existing patronage structures. First, cellular phone technology 
enhances the capacity of ISAF/GIRO to provide important benefits to rural communities, 
a development that would directly challenge the Taliban’s strategy of isolation. Mobile 
governance is an emerging concept that could help extend the GIROA’s reach. Siddharta 
Raja states that this concept has two components, service delivery and program 
management.170 Most of the programs described in this study’s section on economic 
utility and safety are representative of service delivery programs because they use the 
mobile phone as the medium through which to deliver tangible benefits. Therefore, in this 
section, the author focuses his analysis upon program management.  
The second component of mobile governance, program management, involves the 
use of cellular phone technology to supervise the implementation of plans, the 
distribution of salaries, and services receipt verification. This aspect of mobile 
governance is critical because it better enables the GIROA to follow through on its 
commitments to the population and to the workers responsible for project 
implementation. As explained in Chapter II of this study, the primary reason that rural 
Pashtun communities support the Taliban is because they do not trust the GIROA. By 
completing projects and paying workers in a timely manner, the GIROA could improve 
its credibility and possibly become part of a community’s patronage structure. Again, 
mobile telephony makes it easier for the GIROA to achieve this end because it reduces 
the time and space of interactions with the population. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that mobile phone technology is not a panacea, but merely a tool that could amplify 
the effects of effective GIROA, ISAF, or NGO programs.  
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G.  CONCLUSION 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1 in this chapter, the author has described the 
opportunities resulting from the expansion or introduction of a cellular phone networks in 
rural Pashtun communities. Additionally, he described how limiting factors could be 
mitigated. He will use this data to conduct hypothesis testing in Chapter VI. In the 
following chapter, he evaluates the role that an expansion of radio broadcast 
infrastructure can have on social adaption in rural Pashtun communities.  
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V. EXPANSION OF RADIO BROADCAST INFRASTRUCTURE 
Radio could be the most wonderful public communication system 
imaginable, a gigantic system of channels--could be, that is, if it were 
capable not only of transmitting but of receiving, of making listeners hear 
but also speak, not of isolating them but connecting them.171  
A. OVERVIEW 
While radio broadcasts in Brecht’s time (i.e., the 1920s-30s) were largely one-
way, he appears to have understood the medium’s capacity for social communication. In 
an age of rapid telecommunication and social networking, it is easy to see how one might 
conclude that radio broadcasting has lost relevance. However, as the author shows in the 
next section of this chapter, radio remains the salient channel for communication in rural 
Pashtun communities.  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the expansion or introduction of the 
radio broadcast infrastructure will impact social adaptation in Afghanistan’s rural Pashtun 
communities. First, the author briefly describes the history and state of the radio 
broadcast infrastructure in Afghanistan. Second, he evaluates how the expansion of the 
radio broadcast infrastructure (IV# 3) positively or negatively impacts four factors 
governing adaptation: economic utility, informational reach, patronage, and safety. This 
analysis sets conditions for hypothesis testing in Chapter VI.  
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE #3: RADIO BROADCAST 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Other than person-to-person communication, no other medium of social 
communication in Afghanistan is as historically significant as radio. King Amanullah 
Khan commissioned the construction of Afghanistan’s first two broadcast systems in 
1925, a foundation upon which successive regimes expanded the country’s radio 
infrastructure. This growth was particularly pronounced during the 1980s when the Union 
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of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) assisted the communist Afghan government in 
establishing a radio broadcast infrastructure that provided service to the entire country. 
Radio Afghanistan, the government’s state-run network, disseminated propaganda 
throughout the nation, a practice continued by the Taliban’s Radio Shari’at.172  
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the landscape of radio broadcasting in 
Afghanistan became more diverse. State-controlled radio has continued to serve as the 
GIROA’s main communication tool. Broadcasting on AM, FM, and shortwave bands and 
through a network of provincial branches, government broadcasting primarily reaches 
target audiences residing in provincial capitals. Similarly, foreign broadcasts, primarily 
emanating from neighboring countries and stations associated with ISAF member-states, 
represent an important aspect of Afghanistan’s information environment.  
The newest fixtures of Afghan’s radio-based information environment, private 
and independent radio stations began to appear throughout the country in 2003. Private 
stations, primarily established by businesses and natives returning from exile in the wake 
of the Taliban’s loss of power of 2001, are popular with young listeners because of their 
emphasis upon entertainment. Independent radio stations, on the other hand, are more 
closely associated with NGOs that assist in their development and emphasize social 
awareness and public information. The Internews Network, an American NGO, was the 
first organization to implement independent and community-based radio programs in 
Afghanistan. Since 2003, Internews has established about 40 FM stations that broadcast 
programming ranging from entertainment to social awareness.173 As shown in Figure 5.1, 
most independent radio stations operate in urban areas and have a small broadcast range 
relative to state-run and foreign outlets.  
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Figure 5.1. Comparison of State-Run, International, and Independent Radio Outlet 
Broadcast Ranges174 
While each element of Afghanistan’s radio broadcast infrastructure plays a role in 
society, independent and community-based programming appears to have the greatest 
potential to impact social adaptation in rural Pashtun villages. External radio broadcasts 
emanating from state-run and foreign networks have important limitations as a medium 
of social communication with rural Pashtun communities. For example, although Radio 
Afghanistan generated a large audience in the 1980s, most of the population viewed the  
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information with great skepticism.175 An interview with an Afghan informant regarding 
the role of state-run radio after 1978 shows that broadcasting was not attuned to local 
matters affecting target audience: 
…after 1978 everything changed and all media facilities had to support the 
party manifesto. Programs were produced to promote the unity of young 
Russians and Afghans, they promoted the hate of western countries, called 
people who knew English or were educated in the West CIA agents. Many 
were killed by secret police. Everything followed party policy, radio was 
like a microphone of the party. Independent press centers were closed, 
music studios closed, print shops closed….It was announced that no one 
had the right to run independent media, it was all nationalized by the 
Communists.176 
Despite calculated efforts by the communist government to embrace tribalism and 
to loosen interpretive restrictions on programming, Radio Afghanistan never gained the 
trust of its target audience. Consequently, many listeners pursued alternative information 
sources, namely foreign broadcasts. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World 
Service was among the most popular foreign broadcast alternatives. The BBC’s emphasis 
upon legitimate news and unbiased reporting resonated with rural Afghan males, who 
cited the need to appear competent in the exchange of relative information with their 
networks as the most important social imperative driving them to listen to the BBC 
World Service.177 In fact, the communist government was so aware of this imperative 
that Radio Afghanistan incorporated anti-BBC themes into its programming. As another 
Afghan informant reported, “every night [Radio Afghanistan] had two or three reports 
that were just anti-BBC propaganda.”178 
While the BBC Pashto and Persian news services did experience a degree of 
success during the communist government, it encountered some important problems in 
social communication. First, since the news was broadcasted from London, generating 
                                                 
175 Gordon Adams, “Radio in Afghanistan: Socially Useful Communications in Wartime,” in Media 
and Global Change: Rethinking Communication for Development, ed. Oscar Hemer and Thomas Tufte 
(Buenos Aires: CLASCO, 2005), 351.  
176 Andrew Skuse, “Radio, Politics, and Trust in Afghanistan,” Gazette 64 (2002): 270.  
177 Ibid., 276.  
178 Ibid., 271.  
 75
relevant community information about farming, health, and education required a 
meticulous and localized research effort. Given the distance, security concerns, and a 
poor telephone infrastructure, the BBC’s sources could not have conducted the rigorous 
research effort required for tailored programming. Second, the BBC was not organized to 
provide such coverage. The BBC allocated only one Pakistani-based reporter to cover the 
Afghan War. Third, the BBC did not have much experience in the field of social 
communication, a result of the organization’s belief that it was tantamount to 
propaganda.179 Consequently, while the BBC was an important source of reliable news 
for the Afghan population at the macro level, it was not equipped to develop 
programming that could affect social change in rural Pashtun communities.  
After the Taliban seized Afghanistan’s broadcast infrastructure, it continued to 
employ state-run radio as its primary medium through which to communicate with the 
population. Shari’at Radio continued Radio Afghanistan’s tradition of disseminating 
propaganda that was supportive of the Taliban’s religious and political perspective. 
Despite this similarity, Shari’at Radio enjoyed more popularity among rural Afghans 
because its programming was conservative, made use of religiosity, and appealed to their 
sense of Pashtun identity.180 Still, as shown in Table 5.1, many listeners favored foreign 
radio broadcasts, judging it to be a more impartial source of news and information. Skuse 
concludes that despite sharing important social endowments with the populace, Radio 
Shari’at did not satisfy the rural Afghans’ need for confirmed news reporting to the same 
degree as the BBC World Service. Again, as discussed in Chapter I, possessing relevant 
news for dissemination within information-hungry social networks is an important source 
of honor for Afghan males. It should be noted that technical limitations played an 
important role in shaping the listener preference data reflected in Table 5.1.  Due to the 
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of time, forcing them to select a small number of available stations relative to wealthier 
families.181  Still, data related to BBC World Service’s listenership reflects the 
population’s strong preference for confirmed reporting.   
 
Radio Station Female Listeners 
(N = 146) 
Male Listeners 
(N = 197) 
BBC World Service 75% 82% 
Voice of Shari’at Radio 47% 60% 
Radio Iran 43% 41% 
Voice of America 24% 35% 
Radio Pakistan 24% 27% 
All India Radio 21% 18% 
 
Table 5.1. A Survey of Listeners’ Radio Station Preferences in Afghanistan 
(1998)182 
While centralized, state-run radio seems to have generated audiences in 
Afghanistan since the 1970s, it does not appear to have played an important role in 
shaping social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities. Community radio, on the other 
hand, represents a potentially powerful alternative to centralized broadcasting. The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) describes 
community radio as a medium through which citizens gain an understanding of the forces 
that guide their lives and, ultimately, voice their views.183 A Center for International 
Media Assistance Community Radio Working Group reports describes the several things 
community radio must do to serve the public interest. First, a representative body of local 
leaders must guide this broadcast model to make programming decisions. Second, these 
local leaders must possess the capacity and will to inform programming decisions with 
reference to the community’s most pressing needs. Other important characteristics of  
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effective community radio include ensuring wide participation in programming, serving 
as an independent source of information, and encouraging horizontal dialogue among 
community members.184  
Consequently, for the purposes of this study, community radio is a localized and 
independent programming model that emphasizes dialogue with the listeners and is 
mindful of the needs of the population. While state-run radio, such as Voice of 
Afghanistan and Shari’at Radio, has generated audiences over the years, it has not been a 
persuasive source of social communication within Afghanistan. Consequently, the author 
evaluates the role that community-based radio can have on social adaptation on rural 
Pashtun communities in the following sections.  
C.  ECONOMIC UTILITY 
As observed in Chapter II of this study, the Taliban’s rural strategy isolates 
remote Pashtunn communities, leading to the development of an economic condition 
characterized by poor market functions and interminable poverty for many citizens. As 
seen with cellular phones in Chapter IV, for community radio to increase economic utility 
in rural Pashtun communities, it would have to break the Taliban’s informational 
blockade and foster information exchanges between community members and with 
external entities needed to foster development.  
Community radio can increase economic utility in rural Pashtun communities 
whose economies are based upon agriculture and livestock. Mohammad Eshaq suggests 
that years of war have reduced Afghanistan’s collective knowledge about agricultural 
techniques. Suffering from a lack of expertise in this field, Afghan farmers are now more 
susceptible to the loss of crops and livestock at the hands of disease, weather, or poor 
technique.185 At the most basic level, community radio can host programs that allow 
local farmers to discuss agricultural techniques or to express their grievances to 
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community leaders. Community radio can also be a valuable source of information for 
local farmers seeking price information. Using cellular phone technology, radio station 
operators can contact district markets for commodity price information. Subsequently, 
they could broadcast this information through community radio programming. This type 
of information will be important to the population because it will not only preclude 
farmers from having to take unnecessary trips to market, but it will also give them 
leverage for price negotiations. Community radio will also give GIROA agencies, such as 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), an important conduit of for the dissemination of 
useful public information for farmers. For example, the MoA could distribute recordings 
of roundtable discussions between agricultural experts about a wide variety of topics, 
such as weather predictions, irrigation techniques, crisis management (plant epidemics), 
and policy explanation. In keeping with the spirit of community radio, the station could 
integrate these recording into local programming, giving broadcasts a local flavor and 
give community members the opportunity to respond.  
Another way that community radio can have a positive impact upon economic 
utility is by encouraging local efforts to extract and report mineral deposits. Reputable 
estimates show that royalties from Afghanistan’s mineral industry could be as high as 
one-third of the national budget and can create several thousand jobs.186 The discovery of 
one of the world’s largest copper mines in eastern Afghanistan in 2008 and the recent 
discovery of substantial lithium deposits highlights the potential for a developmental 
boon for the country.187 Community radio could play an important role in helping poor 
rural Pashtun communities realize potential profits. First, many minerals are extracted by 
community members. However, artisanal miners sometimes employ crude methods, such 
as blasting destroy precious stones like emerald crystals, ruby, and lapis lazuli, reducing 
their value. Mohammad Eshaq suggests that community radio stations could serve as a  
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local conduit through which the Ministry of Mines (MoM) could distribute public service 
announcements and educational materials that encourage locals to use less destructive 
mining techniques.188  
Another important role that community radio could play in helping community 
members benefit from mining activities, according to the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP), are activities that “support community sensitization and participation.”189 
Community radio could serve as a forum for the population to air grievances and make 
recommendations to local leaders and representatives of foreign companies about mining 
activities in the community. Such a forum could prove to be a very important fixture in 
communities where the introduction of external mining activities would almost certainly 
cause social friction.190 Having such an option could provide a means for local leaders, 
corporations, and the population to resolve points of social friction that prevent the 
potential delivery of economic benefits to the people.  
D.  SAFETY 
The expansion of a community radio network into rural Pashtun communities can 
positively impact their sense of safety. Perhaps community radio has the greatest 
potential to improve a rural Pashtun community’s sense of safety in the area of public 
health. As described in Chapter IV of this study, rural Pashtun communities face many 
grave public health challenges. At the most basic level, community radio can tell citizens 
how to treat serious diseases. This medium could be particularly useful in teaching the 
audience about effective preventive medicine techniques. Since diarrhea and malaria can 
be fatal in Afghanistan, community radio would be a useful source of information to 
teach people how to ensure that their water is safe to drink.191  
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Another way that community radio can be useful in promoting public health is 
through coordination. It is common for ISAF and NGOs to conduct mobile health clinics 
in rural communities. Since information infrastructure is so poor in many of these areas, 
community members sometimes receive no prior notification of the arrival of these 
clinics. Consequently, clinics allocate three days of work remote areas; one day each for 
clinic arrival, allowing time for word to spread, and treating patients.192 Community 
radio can notify the community of a mobile clinic’s arrival, increasing the efficiency with 
which a clinic can service a community. On a related note, community radio stations 
equipped with cellular phone technology will be even more effective because they can 
receive updated arrival estimates and other instructions from clinic operators.  
An important connection exists between safety and education, something that 
community radio can resolve to the betterment of the community. In many parts of rural 
Afghanistan, today’s security environment is not conducive to the safe movement of 
teachers and students to educational facilities. An important by-product of this condition 
is that teachers, especially women, are discouraged from attending educational and 
training programs. In Afghanistan, radio-based distributive learning programs, such as 
the USAID’s It’s Great to Learn, provide training modules that allow teachers to earn 
official certification.193 Community radio can serve as a conduit through which teachers 
complete such a curriculum, allowing teachers to earn certification without having to bear 
the economic and security costs of travelling. 
There are important limitations to the ability of community radio’s ability to 
improve a community’s sense of safety. In fact, it is possible for the presence of 
community radio to have a negative impact on this sense. For example, community 
members unhappy with the presence of community radio have threatened operators with  
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night letters in other parts of Afghanistan.194 Additionally, insurgents, viewing local 
radio programming as an effective counter-message to its own broadcasts, routinely issue 
death threats to radio operators.195  
E.  INFORMATIONAL REACH 
Radio has tremendous capacity to reach target audiences in Afghanistan. While 
high levels of illiteracy, limited access to electricity, and cost are important limitations 
for cellular phones in Afghanistan, most Afghans have access to radio broadcasts. There 
are approximately 114 radios per every 1,000 people in Afghanistan, making it the most 
prevalent non-traditional source of information in the country.196 Additionally, the 
average Afghan in rural areas can tune into two radio stations.197 Radio receivers are 
inexpensive, costing as little as $1 per unit. Another factor governing community radio’s 
informational reach in rural Pashtun areas is its adaptability to meeting local needs, 
making it more relevant to the target audience.198 Consequently, community radio is the 
most cost-efficient means through which to deliver localized programming in rural 
Pashtun communities.  
Opposing these positive considerations governing community radio’s ability to 
reach target audiences are some important limitations. First, as seen in Chapter IV with 
cellular phone based programs, the successful implementation of community radio 
programs is reliant upon operator skill. Advising station operators and governing board 
members about planning and executing relevant community programming is only one 
part of the solution. Since successful community radio is predicated upon the active 
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participation of the audience, advisors must also facilitate the creation of outreach 
programs. To this end, advisors could facilitate the education of a core group of citizens 
who could promote the use of community radio as a means of dialogue within their 
respective social networks. For example, this core of “agents” could distribute the cellular 
phone number of the radio station and could recommend that community members text in 
recommendations for program discussions. Not only would this generate audiences by 
framing broadcast discussions in community terms, thus expanding community radio’s 
reach, it would foster a sense of cooperation within the community. Whether engaging 
radio operators, the governing board, or the community target audience, such a program 
will put broadcasts in the hands of the people who have the community’s long-term 
interests in mind.199 Consequently, advisors should not view their role as simply training 
staff at the radio station, but as training the whole community to participate in a radio 
network. By doing so, information strategists ensure that information systems create 
closer links within rural Pashtun social networks, generating not only a sense of 
ownership, but also a sense of cooperation.  
However, such an investment in the training and education of the community 
radio network requires time and money. Estimates show that such an effort would require 
the presence of an advisory staff for up to six months in rural Afghan communities.200 
Additionally, the establishment of a network of community radio stations in rural 
Afghanistan would likely require the support of foreign donors.  
This requirement represents a small part of a larger problem: sustainability. 
Simply stated, if communities cannot sustain their radio programs, they cannot reach 
audiences and engage them in social communication. The author already discussed the 
first two factors governing the sustainability of community radio in rural Pashtun areas, 
financial and training. Approximately 35 community radio stations currently operate in 
Afghanistan, all of which have required the financial support of foreign donors. However, 
the provision of these resources is inadequate to ensure sustainable radio programs.  
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A sense of community ownership is also an important factor affecting the 
sustainability of community radio. USAID’s reconstruction strategy faces criticism 
because many of its projects have not been completed or have fallen into immediate 
disrepair because they did not adequately address community needs.201 Mortensen’s 
experience in rural Pashtun areas of western Pakistan shows that the goals of the 
developer are not always in synch with those of the community. He concluded that before 
useful reconstruction could start, the developer must establish meaningful relationships 
with important members of the community and allow them to use their own institutions to 
determine priorities. Only then, could the developer sustain a cooperative environment of 
reconstruction.202 Similarly, community radio does not represent a “quick-fix.” Viewed 
through Mortensen’s lens, getting the community to see the potential benefits of a 
program is part of the relationship building process. The provision of financial and 
training resource, then, serves as a bridge for the next phase of engagement: developing a 
sense of community ownership and empowerment for the radio station.  
F.  PATRONAGE 
The expansion of community radio into rural Pashtun communities can 
manipulate or reinforce existing patronage structures. First, community radio is an 
excellent conduit through which the GIROA can communicate with the population, 
promoting governance and transparency. Community radio’s independence and emphasis 
upon open dialogue with the audience could legitimize government communications with 
the population. For example, district leaders could participate in a call-in show on 
community radio, fielding questions from members of the community and discussing 
government activities, such as reconstruction. By doing so, the government official is 
able to demonstrate capacity, and offer both encouragement and meter expectations of the 
population.  
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Community radio is a potentially effective medium for the GIROA for two 
important reasons. First, since the community radio station is independent and the 
programming format promotes dialogue, the audience would be less likely to dismiss 
such communications as propaganda. Second, as discussed in Chapter II, the population’s 
poor perception of the GIROA represents a major reason for the insurgency in 
Afghanistan. Community radio can play an important role in reconciling the population 
to the GIROA and with one another. In Liberia, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has implemented community radio as a key part of its strategy to achieve 
such an objective in areas marked by informational isolation. A key element of this 
strategy is the government’s effort to explain the Commission’s findings and use the 
population’s understanding as the first step of implementing its national reconciliation 
strategy.203 Similarly, the GIROA could engage community radio station networks in 
rural Pashtun regions to promote national reconciliation. 
Ironically, the GIROA appears to be the most important limiting factor to 
community radio’s potential to improve its own legitimacy with rural Pashtun 
populations. First, the GIROA has a poor track record of media engagement. For 
example, government sources are hesitant to be interviewed by journalists.204 In fact, the 
Karzai government has been hostile towards independent media in the past. For example, 
Afghan media mogul Saad Mosheni reports that the GIROA routinely employ bribery 
and coercion against journalists and outlets to ensure that they do not become a political 
liability.205  
In fairness, the GIROA has developed policies and created opportunities for 
journalists that contrast sharply with the Taliban’s restrictive policies. The GIROA have 
passed media laws that have improved the state of media within Afghanistan since 
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2002.206 While the politics of media support and journalistic freedom have come a long 
way since the establishment of the GIROA, new policies governing transparent licensing 
and broadcasting are necessary for creating a landscape that nurtures community radio.  
G. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the author has described the opportunities resulting from the 
expansion or introduction of a community radio in rural Pashtun communities. 
Additionally, he described the limitations associated with state-run and foreign 
broadcasters. While both generate audiences, they lack the ability to engage the 
population in social communications like community radio. In the following chapter, he 
evaluates the role that an expansion of radio broadcast infrastructure can have on social 
adaption in rural Pashtun communities. 
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VI. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct hypothesis testing. To this end, the 
author first calls upon research data from Chapters II through VI to assess how each of 
the study’s independent variables affects social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities. 
He operationalizes assessment output by using Merton’s typology, described in Chapter 
1. Second, he uses these outputs as the foundation upon which to evaluate hypothesis 
performance. 
B.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE #1: THE TALIBAN’S RURAL 
INFORMATION STRATEGY 
1.  Economic Utility 
Aspects of the Taliban’s information strategy that govern a community’s 
economic utility have both a negative and positive impact on the rural Pashtun 
population’s social adaptation. As described in Chapters II and III, the Taliban’s goals to 
isolate communities economically and to disrupt developmental activities would typically 
result in the population’s rejection of the Taliban. The accumulation of wealth is not 
inconsistent with rural Pashtun culture. In fact, wealth is an important source of honor 
and power within these remote communities. Therefore, denying the population’s access 
to external sources of money, information, and development has both a negative 
economic and social impact within rural Pashtun communities. However, the violent 
means by which the Taliban pursues its economic strategy goals may force these 
communities to accept its demands. The threat of violent reprisals, high illiteracy, limited 
access to external information, and a lack of access to capital all leave the population 
with little means with which to respond to the Taliban’s strategy with anything other than 
compliance.  
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2.  Safety 
From the perspective of physical security, the population is likely to demonstrate 
similar patterns of adaptive behavior as those described in the previous section. The 
Taliban’s campaign of isolation creates increased uncertainty about the future in rural 
communities. As described in Chapter II, rural Pashtun communities, governed by a 
sense of self-determination, typically reject such external influence. However, the 
Taliban’s threat of violent reprisals in the context of an unstable security situation leaves 
the population with little means with which to respond to the Taliban’s strategy with 
anything other than acceptance. Therefore, while the goals of the Taliban’s information 
strategy resonates negatively with the population, the means by which they implement 
the campaign result in popular acceptance.  
3.  Taliban Informational Reach 
The Taliban’s efforts to restrict the population’s access to information are not 
likely to create conformist patterns of adaptation within rural Pashtun populations. As 
described in Chapter III, since a community member’s access to information and 
communications is tied to economic development opportunities and a community leader’s 
sense of honor, it is likely that the Taliban’s restrictive policies would result in 
community rejection. However, as seen with safety and economic utility, the Taliban’s 
threat of violent reprisals and the belief that any protection afforded by ISAF, GIROA, or 
ANSF is only a temporary condition will once again lead the population into tacit 
acceptance.  
4.  Patronage 
Patterns of strong acceptance within the population could emerge from the 
Taliban’s manipulation of a community’s patron-client arrangements. The Taliban’s 
efforts to establish a patron-client relationship with the population are culturally relevant 
and have the potential to gain popular support, particularly in areas outside the reach of 
ISAF/GIROA. As seen in Chapter III, the Taliban has used its shadow government to 
provide services selectively to the population in exchange for varying forms of support. 
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Since the Taliban are limited in their capacity to deliver economic incentives, do not have 
manpower or time to develop strong patron-client relationships with remote communities, 
and routinely coerce the population with acts of violence, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the population will only passively accept such a patron-client relationship out of fear 
of retribution, hardly characteristic of a strong strategic alliance. However, as described 
in Chapter III, the Taliban share important cultural, linguistic, and ethnic social 
endowments with rural Pashtun communities, giving them an important advantage over 
ISAF/GIROA and other external groups in forging points of agreement with the 
population.  
C.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE #2: CELLULAR PHONE NETWORK 
1. Economic Utility 
The expansion of a cellular phone network into rural Pashtun communities will 
exhibit positive and negative impacts upon economic utility. With requisite marketing 
and community-level training, mobile operators and developmental agencies can promote 
the expansion of the cellular phone network as an economic developmental initiative. 
Since the accumulation of wealth is not inconsistent with rural Pashtun values, 
community members will be supportive of the economic goals of a network expansion. 
Similarly, cellular phone networks possess the means to deliver real economic benefits. 
As described in Chapter IV, cellular phone applications, such as M-PESA and E-TOPUP, 
can give users in remote communities grater liquidity. Cellular phones can serve as a 
conduit through which to distribute micro-loans and salaries directly to the users, 
bypassing chains of corruption that limit user individual economic utility. Additionally, 
commodity price information can reduce the number of trips users must make to market 
and give them greater leverage in sales negotiations.  
However, the Taliban use violence to disrupt economic development activities 
directly or indirectly related to cellular phone network expansion. As described in 
Chapter IV, the Taliban have shown the capacity to disrupt the network either by shutting 
down towers or by threatening mobile service providers to limit service hours. 
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Consequently, a lack of network operability limits the number of financial transactions 
the population can make. Similarly, as described in Chapter III, the Taliban routinely use 
violence to discourage developmental activities, an operational approach that could 
prevent NGOs from providing advisors and experts needed to implement cellular phone-
based economic development programs.  
2. Safety 
The population’s fear of Taliban reprisals play an important role in limiting 
popular acceptance of cellular phone technology and programs. The population will be 
supportive of measures that seek to use cellular phones to improve public safety. For 
example, ISAF/GIROA, NGOs, and mobile operator programs can incentivize the 
population to become subscribers by promoting the network’s goal of improving public 
safety. Important programs will include “e-consultation” schemes where a countrywide 
network of doctors is available to provide pro-bono advice for community members. 
Other community health programs include connecting mothers with a mobile midwife 
network or the dissemination of SMS reminders for patients to take medication. Cellular 
phones can also enhance communications with remote communities during times of 
crisis. As explained in Chapter IV, the Afghanistan National Disaster Management 
Authority (ANDMA) can enhance its response to natural disasters by proactively 
distributing “aftershock” warning to communities and to coordinate relief efforts. Since 
this study found no evidence that receiving medical expertise or external assistance 
during a time of crisis is inconsistent with Pashtun culture, the population will accept a 
network expansion based upon its goals.  
However, cellular phone-based programs, while providing an important early 
warning capability, cannot provide direct security to the population. Consequently, such 
programs will not gain and are not capable of gaining popular acceptance based upon 
perceptions of safety alone. As described in Chapters II and III, the Taliban and other 
strongmen living among the population have attacked cellular phone towers and have 
imposed restrictions upon cellular phone use in many communities. Complemented by 
the Taliban’s campaign of violence and coercion, these restrictive measures will promote 
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an environment of danger that outweighs the potential benefits cellular phone-based 
public safety could deliver. Therefore, in areas marked by Taliban control, these 
programs will negatively impact social adaptation.  
3. Informational Reach 
The expansion of the cellular phone network into rural Pashtun areas will improve 
the informational reach of community members and will have a positive impact upon 
social adaptation. Research data from Chapter II shows that Afghans value their social 
networks. Possessing access to information and membership to social networks is an 
important aspect of a rural Pashtun community member’s sense of honor. As Chapter IV 
shows, cellular phones reduce the time and distance Afghans must invest to communicate 
with their social networks and local security forces.  If ISAF/GIROA, NGOs, and mobile 
operators can help community members realize this particular benefit of cellular phones, 
they can incentivize them to support the goal of network expansion. Over time, a user’s 
contacts will build and will eventually have greater access to new resources and 
networks.  
It is important to note, however, that research data from Chapter IV also shows 
that there are several technical and educational considerations, such as a lack of literacy, 
electricity, and skill that must be addressed at the community level for the population to 
realize the potential of cellular phones to increase its informational reach. If sustained 
community-based educational and developmental schemes are incorporated into the 
network expansion effort, communities are likely to demonstrate a high level of 
acceptance in social adaptation. Similarly, in areas marked by Taliban control, the 
Taliban will likely enforce a network shutdown during designated times, further reducing 
the informational reach of the population. Therefore, short of developing a cellular phone 
network resistant to Taliban disruptions or implementing a community engagement 
security plan similar to the one described in Chapter IV, popular acceptance of the 
network expansion will likely be limited in isolated areas.  
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4.  Patronage  
A cellular phone network’s manipulation of existing patronage structures will 
result in different modes of social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities. As described 
in Chapter I, patronage networks are critical to the sustainability of Pashtun communities. 
Since a tremendous sense of honor is associated with being a patron, it is common for 
inter-familial competition and external manipulation to cause conflict within these 
communities. The introduction of potentially useful developmental and informational 
programs from outside the community, particularly if perceived to be the work of the 
GIROA, would likely threaten existing patronage structures. Additionally, since cellular 
phone programs that distribute salaries, micro-loans, and other payments bypass the 
corruption chains inherent to rural patron-client networks, it is likely that influential 
community leaders would oppose the use of cellular phones for economic development in 
such a manner. Given the powerful influence that patrons have in rural Pashtun 
communities, it is likely that the population would initially reject the network’s 
expansion because it would be perceived to threaten existing social structures.  
However, if implemented as part of a comprehensive community engagement 
strategy that includes existing patrons, a cellular phone network could eventually gain 
community acceptance. In fact, as described in Chapter IV, cellular phone-based program 
management programs, such as receipt verification, increase the probability of project 
completion, improving the standing of patrons participating in the process. Therefore, the 
informational and economic benefits that come with the introduction of the cellular phone 
network into a rural community could gain the acceptance of the population if patrons 
can be convinced to play an important part in implementation.  
D.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE #3: COMMUNITY RADIO NETWORK  
1. Economic Utility 
While the establishment of a community radio network into rural Pashtun areas 
could result in popular acceptance regarding economic utility, the Taliban’s local 
information strategy poses significant challenges to conformist adaptation. With 
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sufficient training for community radio station operators and engagement of GIROA 
ministries, local radio can be a conduit for community education on agricultural 
techniques, preventive medicine for livestock, and weather predictions. Additionally, 
community radio can be a valuable source of information for local farmers seeking 
commodity price information. As this study has already observed with the expansion of 
cellular phone networks, community radio can break the Taliban’s informational isolation 
of rural communities, making the population aware of important information that can 
improve their economic utility. To this end, community radio does have one important 
advantage over cellular phones. Unlike cellular phone economic development schemes, 
community radio delivers profitable information, not money, which enables the 
community to use the information to pursue collective solutions within a local context 
instead of being confined to receiving the benefit through a cell phone. This concept is an 
example of how community radio can build cooperative links between community 
members.  
However, as seen with cellular phone networks, that Taliban can disrupt radio 
broadcasts. In response to community radio broadcasting, the Taliban will likely threaten 
community leaders, radio station operators, and members of the community audience to 
discourage active participation in these programs. If ISAF/GIROA cannot disrupt the 
Taliban’s efforts to discourage community radio, programming will likely be 
discontinued or provide irrelevant programming that does not generate audiences.  
2.  Safety 
Again, the population’s fear of Taliban reprisals will limit the range of adaptive 
modes in response to a community radio’s public safety programming. As described in 
Chapter V, community radio can serve as a valuable conduit for the dissemination of 
public information on public health and preventive medicine. Additionally, it can prove 
to be an important link between the GIROA and the population during a time of crisis. 
Similarly, it can be used to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts and mobile medical 
clinics, increasing the probability that the population will be able to take part. 
Community radio can also serve as an important conduit for distributive learning, a 
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scheme that allows teachers to gain their certification without having to traverse unsafe 
roads. As seen with cellular phones, community reduces the time and distance between 
the population and the realization of their certain benefits. Therefore, based upon its goals 
to improve public safety, rural Pashtun communities will be accepting of a community 
radio station.  
However, radio broadcasts will not provide the population a sense of safety in 
areas characterized by poor physical security. As described in Chapter V, the Taliban, 
viewing such radio stations as a threat to its narrative, routinely threaten radio station 
operators through night letters. If established community radio stations cease to operate 
in the face of threats from insurgents or other groups, they will become a symbol of the 
level of insecurity and lack of safety within rural Pashtun areas.  Changing this condition 
will require the presence of a security force that prevents the Taliban from threatening the 
population.   
3.  Informational Reach 
The introduction of community radio broadcasting into rural Pashtun areas has the 
potential to improve the informational reach of community members, but its effectiveness 
is limited by Taliban disruption. As described in Chapters II and V, Pashtun communities 
crave relevant news and public information. This desire for information is not only borne 
of a rural Pashtun community member’s desire to understand the environment, but also 
from a need to increase the sense of honor through demonstrating knowledge to others 
within social networks. Therefore, the community would be supportive of community 
radio’s goal to inform the population better.  
As described in Chapter V, radio is the most readily available and cost-effective 
means through which to disseminate localized programming to rural populations in 
Afghanistan. Community radio by its nature is participatory and audience-driven. 
Consequently, community radio possesses the means by which to gain the community’s 
acceptance as a medium for relevant public information. This acceptance, however, is 
conditional upon the provision of sufficient financial and training resources to generate a 
sense of community ownership needed for program sustainability. As observed in the 
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previous section, it is also conditional upon a security environment that prevents the 
Taliban from disrupting broadcasting through threatening community participants or 
attacking infrastructure. Therefore, in areas controlled by the Taliban, community radio 
will not improve the community’s informational reach.  
4.  Patronage 
Community radio’s manipulation of existing patronage structures will have a 
varied impact upon social adaption in rural Pashtun communities. As described in 
Chapter V, the GIROA can use the community radio as a conduit through which to 
engage in dialogue with the population, improving perceptions of legitimacy and 
transparency. Since dialogue and discussion are central characteristics of community 
radio, it gives the GIROA the opportunity to engage the populace in social 
communication that is quite distinct from propaganda. As described in Chapter II, since 
such dialogue between leaders and the community is not culturally inconsistent in rural 
Pashtun areas, community radio can enable the GIROA to become a potential patron by 
more effectively providing governance and services.  
However, community radio could represent a threat to existing patron-client 
structures within rural communities, setting conditions for popular rejection or even the 
discontinuation of broadcasts. As described in Chapter V, effective community radio is 
built upon transparency and open dialogue. Programming of this nature could undermine 
community social structures, often determined by familial link, tribal affiliations, and 
patron-client agreements. Since, as described in Chapter I, rural Pashtun culture 
emphasizes honor, shame, and revenge, it is not inconceivable that local strongmen and 
Taliban could take active measures against station operators or audiences in response to a 
perceived encroachment upon their interests. Consequently, community radio, under such 
conditions, will not generate a participatory audience in rural Pashtun communities.  
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E.  HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
1.  Hypothesis 1: The Taliban’s Rural Information Strategy Is 
Susceptible to Informational Exploitation 
Figure 6.1 summarizes this study’s observations about how rural Pashtun 
communities manifest social adaptation in response to the Taliban’s information strategy. 
In summary, community responses reflect a divergence between the Taliban and the 
population’s goals. However, the means through which the Taliban implements its 
strategy appears to have created a stronger level of popular acceptance. Simply stated, 
while the population disagrees with the objectives of the Taliban in many cases, they do 
not actively rebel against them for the security, informational, and economic reasons 
identified in this study. Consequently, viewed through the lens of Merton’s typology, the 
mode of adaptation that best represents these findings is ritualism.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Summary of the population’s responses to the Taliban’s information 
strategy. Adapted from Merton’s Typology of Social Adaptation 
Acceptance (+), Rejection (-)207 
                                                 
207 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 140.  
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This study shows that since the behavior the population will likely exhibit in 
response to the Taliban’s information strategy is not consistent with conformist modes of 
social adaptation, it is susceptible to informational exploitation. Therefore, this study’s 
data supports Hypothesis 1 (Figure 6.2). Since ritualistic modes of social adaptation 
appear to be most apparent in rural Pashtun communities, there is room for a localized 
ISAF/GIROA strategy to create vulnerabilities that a skillful information strategy could 
exploit. In the following sections, this study will test hypotheses 2 and 3 to determine if 




Figure 6.2. Testing Results for Hypothesis 1 
2.  Hypothesis 2: The Expansion of Afghanistan’s Cellular Phone 
Network in Rural Pashtun Areas Can Create Vulnerabilities for the 
Taliban 
Figure 6.3 summarizes this study’s observations about how rural Pashtun 
communities manifest social adaptation in response to the expansion of a cellular phone 
network. Community responses reflect a divergence between the population’s acceptance 
of the cellular network’s goals and its rejection of the means by which it achieves those 
goals. The only point of rejection seen in the population’s response to the cellular 
network’s goals is with regard to patronage, as discussed in the previous section. 
However, the means through which the cellular network delivers informational and 
economic benefits result in strong level of popular rejection. Based upon this study’s  
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data, the rejection is based upon the population’s fear of Taliban reprisals or other forms 
of violence. Therefore, viewed through the lens of Merton’s typology, the mode of 
adaptation that best represents these findings is innovation.  
 
 
Figure 6.3. Summary of the population’s responses to the introduction of a cellular 
phone network. Adapted from Merton’s Typology of Social Adaptation 
Acceptance (+), Rejection (-) 
This study observes that since the introduction of a cellular phone network into 
rural Pashtun areas would likely result in innovative modes of adaptation, Hypothesis 2 is 
only partially supported. Since, as this study’s testing of the first hypothesis shows, the 
dominant mode of popular adaptation that emerges from the Taliban’s information 
strategy is not conformist, the expansion of a cellular phone network has some potential 
to create vulnerabilities. However, the population’s fear of reprisals, illiteracy, and a lack 
of technical skill represent the most important reasons for a rural community’s 
unwillingness to accept the cellular phone network fully. Consequently, innovative 
modes of adaptation that the expansion of a cellular phone network creates will do little 
to create a sizeable vulnerability for the Taliban’s rural strategy without the 
implementation of a comprehensive ISAF/GIROA strategy that creates an environment 
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that enables and incentivizes the population to embrace cellular phone programs. By 
doing so, ISAF/GIROA can move the population’s mode of adaptation from innovation 
to conformity.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Testing Results for Hypothesis 2 
3.  Hypothesis 3: The Expansion of Afghanistan’s Radio Broadcast into 
Rural Pashtun Areas can Create Vulnerabilities for the Taliban 
Figure 6.5 summarizes this study’s observations about how rural Pashtun 
communities manifest social adaptation in response to the introduction of a community 
radio program. In summary, community responses reflect an inverse relationship between 
community acceptance of the radio program’s goals and the means by which it achieves 
them. Again, this study observes that population’s concerns over retribution by local 
strongmen or by the Taliban represents the best explanation for this variance. 
Consequently, viewed through the lens of Merton’s typology, the mode of adaptation that 
best represents these findings is innovation.  
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Figure 6.5. Summary of the population’s responses to the introduction of 
community radio. Adapted from Merton’s Typology of Social 
Adaptation Acceptance (+), Rejection (-) 
Consequently, Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported. As described in Chapter 
V, establishing a community radio program within rural areas will require the presence of 
experts who can advise station operators and the local leaders on technical and 
programming matters. Additionally, advisors will need to interact with community 
members to educate them on the way their participation in community radio stations can 
enhance their lives. Central to all of this is money, as advisors will require radio 
equipment and money to establish community programs. The population’s hesitance to 
participate out of fear of reprisals will likely be reflected in NGO unwillingness to fund 
such initiatives because of security concerns. Therefore, as seen in the cellular phone 
illustrative example, for the expansion of community radio to induce a shift in popular 
modes of adaptation from innovation to conformity, it must occur in the context of a 
broader ISAG/GIROA effort to improve local security conditions. In the next chapter, the 
author makes recommendations on how ISAF/GIROA can best achieve this.  
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Figure 6.6. Testing Results for Hypothesis 3 
F.  CONCLUSION 
Based upon the analysis in the preceding sections of this chapter, Figure 6.7 
highlights hypothesis performance for this study. In the next chapter, the author 
summarizes this study’s key findings and offers planning recommendations for 






Figure 6.7. Hypothesis Performance 
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VII.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This study provides observations on how competing information strategies impact 
social adaptation in Pashtun areas of rural Afghanistan. A comparison of the Taliban’s 
rural information strategy and a potential GIROA/ISAF initiative that expands cellular 
phone/radio broadcast networks into rural Pashtun communities shows divergence in the 
population’s resultant modes of adaptive behavior that could create an operational 
vulnerability for the Taliban. However, it also observes that the success of such an 
ISAF/GIROA plan can be sharply limited by the Taliban’s physical control and a lack of 
expertise to advise the population on program implementation.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Summary of Hypothesis Performance 
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To understand how the expansion of the information infrastructure into rural 
Pashtun communities could create an operational vulnerability for the Taliban, the author 
assessed how three independent variables resulted in specific modes of behavior. To this 
end, the author evaluated each variable within a framework of relevant socio-cultural 
factors governing social adaptation in rural Pashtun communities.  
1. Independent Variables 
1. The Taliban’s information strategy in rural Pashtun communities 
2. The expansion of a cellular phone network into rural Pashtun communities 
3. The expansion of radio broadcast infrastructure into rural Pashtun 
communities.  
2. Factors Governing Social Adaptation in Rural Pashtun Communities 
1. Economic Utility 
2. Informational Reach 
3. Patronage 
4. Safety 
B.  FINDINGS—HYPOTHESES 
1. Hypothesis 1: The Taliban’s Rural Strategy Is Susceptible to 
Informational Exploitation  
Analysis: This study’s examination of the Taliban’s rural information strategy 
supports Hypothesis 1. As described in Chapter VI, the population’s resultant behavior is 
not consistent with conformist modes of social adaptation. Instead, this study shows that 
the population’s response more closely resembles ritualism. While divergence exists 
between the goal orientation of the Taliban and rural Pashtun communities, the means by 
which the Taliban exploit shared social endowments with the population, use violence as 
a means of influencing behavior, exploit local conflict, and isolate areas from external 
influence induces popular compliance. The mere absence of conformist modes of 
adaptation supports Hypothesis 1. However, under current conditions, rebellious and 
innovative modes of adaptation within rural Pashtun communities are not possible 
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without first introducing a counter-strategy that disrupts the Taliban’s ability to threaten 
and isolate (economic and informational) the population. The author provides 
recommendations on how best to implement such a strategy in the following section of 
this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. IV #1 and Ritualistic Modes of Social Adaptation 
2. Hypothesis 2: The Expansion of Afghanistan’s Cellular Phone 
Network into Rural Pashtun Areas Can Create Vulnerabilities for the 
Taliban 
Analysis: This study’s examination of the expansion of Afghanistan’s cellular 
phone network into rural Pashtun areas partially supports Hypothesis 2. As described in 




most closely resemble innovative modes of social adaptation. Community responses 
reflect a divergence between the population’s acceptance of the cellular network’s goals 
and its rejection of the means by which it achieves those goals.  
This study observes strong popular acceptance of the network’s goals, particularly 
from the perspective of economic utility and informational reach. As described in 
Chapters IV and VI, basic cellular phone-based programs involving M-PESA, E-TOPUP, 
and commodity price information applications have the capacity to either directly or 
indirectly improve community liquidity. From the perspective of informational reach, 
cellular phones reduce the time and distance Afghans must invest to communicate with 
their social networks. Additionally, they improve the prospects for horizontal and lateral 
communications with other social networks, something that directly counters the 
Taliban’s strategy of informational isolation. The only point of rejection seen in the 
population’s response to the cellular network’s goals is with regard to patronage since 
some community leaders will likely reject cellular phone programs that deliver economic 
benefits directly to the population, potentially disrupting profitable patron-client 
arrangements.  
However, the means through which the cellular network delivers informational 
and economic benefits result in a strong level of popular rejection. Based upon this 
study’s data, the rejection is based upon the population’s fear of Taliban reprisals or other 
forms of violence. Since cellular phones do not possess the means to provide direct safety 
to the user, the Taliban’s unchecked efforts to discourage cellular phone use will likely 
have a negative impact upon social adaptation. Additionally, as described in Chapter IV, 
illiteracy, a lack of technical skill, and limited access to electricity inhibit rural 
populations’ use of cellular phones. Overcoming these hurdles will require the 
implementation of localized educational and training, particularly for cellular phone-
based economic development programs. Consequently, while the introduction of cellular 
phone networks into rural Pashtun communities could have a positive impact upon social 




the emergence of adaptive behaviors within rural Pashtun communities necessary to 




Figure 7.3. IV #2 and Innovative Modes of Social Adaptation 
3.  Hypothesis 3: The Expansion of Afghanistan’s Radio Broadcast 
Infrastructure into Rural Pashtun Areas Can Create Vulnerabilities 
for the Taliban 
Analysis: This study’s examination of the expansion of Afghanistan’s radio 
broadcast network into rural Pashtun areas partially supports Hypothesis 3. As seen with 
the cellular phone network study, the population’s response to the expansion of radio 
broadcast infrastructure will most closely resemble innovative modes of social 
adaptation. Community responses reflect a convergence of the population and network 
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expansion’s goal orientation. Since the delivery of economic, social, and informational 
benefits are not inconsistent with rural Pashtun culture, the population will likely support 
the objectives of community radio programming. As described in Chapters V and VI, 
community radio delivers relevant and tailored programming to local communities, a 
clear departure from the state-run programming model so unpopular with many Afghans. 
Community radio can serve as a conduit through which the experts can conduct 
interactive discussions with the population about a variety of topics including agricultural 
techniques, current events, and public health. Additionally, community radio can serve as 
a tool for community leaders to engage the population in dialogue about community 
events, building cooperative links and trust needed to develop collective solutions to local 
problems. This model of radio broadcasting creates a vulnerability for the Taliban in a 
way that traditional, state-run models cannot.  
However, the means by which community radio delivers such benefits will likely 
result in equally strong levels of popular rejection. As seen with the cellular phone 
network, the fear of Taliban reprisals represents a major reason for a lack of overt 
acceptance. This condition will also discourage the commitment of NGOs and radio 
experts who, as described in Chapter V, would have to have a protracted presence in the 
community order to assist with the establishment of a sustainable program. Consequently, 
while community radio has the capacity to achieve exploitable modes of adaptation, the 
probability of program success and the creation of a vulnerability for the Taliban is 
increased with sustained advisory assistance and a permissive security environment. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is partially supported.  
 109
 
Figure 7.4. IV #3 and Ritualistic Modes of Social Adaptation 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Information strategists seeking to expand cellular phone networks and radio 
broadcast infrastructures into rural Pashtun areas must be mindful of a critical planning 
constraint, ISAF’s planned withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Given 
limitations upon time and resources, an appropriate strategic framework should be 
focused upon leverage points, creating opportunities in specific areas where small efforts 
can quickly spark adaptive behaviors that undermine the Taliban’s information strategy. 
To this end, strategic planning should consider three guiding principles.  
First, information strategists should prioritize program implementation to support 
Village Stability Platforms (VSP). VSPs are already in place in communities where 
improving security through the establishment of local security forces and economic 
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development could create an operational vulnerability that can be exploited against the 
Taliban. This program is enabled by the continuous presence of embedded ISAF 
personnel who train community security forces and engage local leaders to generate 
community-driven developmental projects. This presence of such an apparatus has the 
potential to counter the Taliban’s campaign of violence that plays a central role in 
limiting the effectiveness of cellular phones and community radio to impact social 
adaptation positively.  
By integrating cellular phone and community radio-based programs with ongoing 
VSP operations, strategists can use a “combined arms approach” to magnify the effects 
they seek to achieve in remote Pashtun areas. For example, as described in Chapters IV 
and V, a key benefit of network expansion is the development of horizontal lines of 
communication between Kabul, ISAF, and local leaders responsible for community 
security. This connection facilitates VSP operations in two important ways. First, from 
the perspective of cellular phones, it facilitates security operations by providing a 
responsive channel through which to communicate tactical information or requests for 
support. This is critical to the sustainability of VSPs since such security arrangements are 
sustained by trust and perceptions of commitment.  
Cellular phones and community radio also give ISAF and GIROA accessible 
channels that allow embedded personnel to exploit local incentive structures more 
effectively. As described in Chapter IV, cellular phones provide a potential pipeline of 
loans and salary payments that improve a community’s economic utility. Additionally, 
both media can directly or indirectly provide medical, educational, security, and 
information needed to the population, giving ISAF VSP advisors greater leverage in 
negotiations with community leaders. Both community radio and cellular phones can 
facilitate better coordination and cooperation between the population, local leaders, and 
developmental agencies, such as USAID or NGOs. Coupled with the consistent presence 
that VSPs provide, network expansion would forge deeper connections with the 
population by reducing the probability that developmental projects will fall into disrepair.  
Second, information strategists should maximize the use of existing cellular 
phone and radio network infrastructure. Doing so reduces the costs and minimizes start-
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up time for implementation. Consequently, information strategists should design 
programs compatible with technologies readily available to the populace. As discussed in 
Chapter IV, carriers like Roshan offer a range of enabling services, such as Interactive 
Voice Recognition and M-PAISA on its GSM network. Investing time and money into 
establishing 3G Networks and Smart Phone technologies, while potentially promising for 
future endeavors, will not create near-term vulnerabilities for the Taliban. The same holds 
true for radio-based technologies, such as digital radio. A key benefit of using existing 
informational infrastructures is that many members of the population are familiar with the 
technology. Consequently, capable users are in better position to teach others within their 
respective communities to use these technologies to benefit.  
Third, information strategists should engage Afghan carriers to expand cellular 
phone networks into as many rural Pashtun areas as possible. As described in Chapter IV, 
cellular phones have the greatest capacity of any other information technology within 
Afghanistan to expand social network size and efficiency. Since 2002, cellular phone 
networks have experienced tremendous growth, which has largely been from the 
grassroots, generated by users seeking to use the technology to improve their lives. In 
areas where carriers are not capable of expanding their network’s footprint, ISAF should 
negotiate to construct them on firebases and forward-operating bases. The Taliban would 
not be able to disrupt network operations in such a case. Additionally, since ISAF will 
likely transition its bases to Afghan forces in the coming years, a security apparatus will 
continue to secure towers, ensuring network sustainability. By investing the time and 
effort to expand network service, ISAF information strategists will be able to evaluate 
atmospherics and carrier data to identify areas generating users. This should cue 
strategists to nominate potential VSP locations where the integrated strategy described 
earlier in this chapter could undermine the Taliban.  
To build upon this research, the author recommends a more in-depth analysis of 
the relationship between the informational and physical domains in determining the 
outcome of competing strategies.  This thesis clearly shows that security conditions are 
crucial in determining the success of information strategies that include the expansion of 
cellular phone and radio broadcast infrastructure.  This observation poses some important 
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questions.  Would these information strategies provide operational benefits in areas 
characterized by stable security environments?  If so, could they sustain security by 
acting as a non-lethal force multiplier?  If not, could they be put to better use in unstable 
areas, supporting security operations by provoking the Taliban to make errors?   
Consequently, further research endeavors related to this thesis should hypothesize 
that stable security conditions are necessary for information strategies to result in 
adaptive behaviors that create vulnerabilities for the Taliban.  An evaluation of the 
performance of this hypothesis could yield important observations about how to prioritize 
resources in support of operations in Afghanistan.  Similarly, it can also address larger 
questions about the role of the informational domain in modern conflict.   
D.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The successful implementation and sustainment of cellular phone and community 
radio-based programs, fully integrated into the VSP framework, requires the support of 
the population and community leaders. To this end, a sense of mutual trust and solid 
demonstrations of commitment will be necessary. As LTC Brian Sweeney suggests in his 
presentation, “An IO Perspective on Afghanistan: An Appreciation of Tribal 
Complexity,” social engagement is influential in rural Pashtun areas because it is based 
upon personal trust.208 The expansion of information infrastructure into these areas 
represents a tremendous opportunity to develop lines of communication both within and 
between communities. Similarly, these programs have the capacity to deliver economic 
and informational benefits to community leaders and their populations. As described 
throughout this study, these benefits will have a positive impact upon social adaptation in 
rural Pashtun communities and create cooperative linkages between enabling agencies 
and the population. Therefore, the effective implementation of a sustainable information 
strategy that introduces community radio and cellular phone networks into rural Pashtun 
areas can create a foundation of trust between the population, community leaders, and the 
GIROA to enhance other areas of social engagement.  
                                                 
208 Sweeney, “An IO Perspective on Afghanistan: An Appreciation for Tribal Complexity.”  
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Consequently, community radio and the cellular phone network could be critical 
enablers to creating trust and cooperative linkages within and between social networks in 
rural Pashtun communities. With persistent effort, the benefits of these information 
systems will become increasingly apparent to the population. Interestingly, this places the 
Taliban on the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, the Taliban could run the risk of 
inciting rebellious modes of social adaptation by adopting coercive measures to deny 
cellular phone service and community radio access to rural communities. On the other 
hand, the Taliban could permit cellular phone and radio services, providing ISAF/GIROA 
an important channel for influence and development. Information strategists should 
anticipate this dilemma and should implement localized informational schemes that 
support VSP operations to exploit rapidly the Taliban’s move in either direction.  
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